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The essays in this volume cover empirical analyses in three fields in finance and
accounting – corporate governance, corporate finance and accounting
conservatism – as well as the relationships between them. How does ownership
structure affect firms’ dividend policy? How could firms’ financial reporting be
influenced by their capital structure decisions? How does accounting conservatism
compare internationally and what could explain the variations? These are some of
the key questions that I seek to address in the following chapters. It is worth
mentioning as well that the impact of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis is one
important theme that runs through all three studies. This crisis started late in the
previous decade and has since had profound influences, not only on the world
economy, but also macroeconomic policies. Indeed, the effects that this event has
on the behaviors of firms and blockholders will receive much attention in this
thesis.
Based on financial and ownership data of French firms, the first essay
focuses on the use of leverage in concentrated ownership structures and its effects




governance and corporate finance is a relevant one, as evident in the recent press
coverage (examples are provided in Chapter 2), but has not so far been explored in
the existing literature. The study of corporate governance primarily concerns the
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a
return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The major cause of this
conflict lies in the separation of control and ownership, which can create severe
agency problems, hence making the structure of corporate ownership a prominent
field within the corporate governance literature. Historically, much attention has
been given to the analysis of economic control of dispersed ownership, in which
controlling managers have the ability and incentives to extract private benefits at
the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This problem, however,
has been found to be characteristic of only large corporations in Anglo-Saxon
countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). A much more common
structure internationally is the concentrated ownership structure, in which a large
shareholder owns a large block of shares. Because blockholders are able to exert
influence on corporate decisions and enjoy the private benefits of control while
retaining protection from the market for corporate control, the concentrated
structure may also lead to a significant agency problem for minority shareholders
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Holderness, 2003). To this end, France should provide
an ideal laboratory for the analysis of impact of blockholding leverage due to its
concentrated corporate ownership characteristic, common use of private leverage
in pyramidal holdings as well as availability of ownership data.
Two competing theories have been put forth to explain the impact of
ownership concentration and dividend policy, i.e. the expropriation hypothesis and
the substitution hypothesis. The first focuses on the asymmetry between dominant
owners’ cash flow and control rights and postulates that the payout of firms with
concentrated ownership should be lower than that of widely-held companies.




would commit to a stable dividend payout to address market concerns over
expropriation risks. This then results in higher equity value, which is considered to
have a greater impact than the potential benefits from retained earnings. While
there has been empirical work in this area, the evidence thus far has been
inconclusive. Additionally, since dividends benefit shareholders but worsen
liquidity positions for creditors, payout policies could create a conflict between the
two capital providers and are especially relevant during difficult periods, such as
the financial crisis. Therefore, the empirical results and insights provided in this
thesis contribute to both strands of literature, particularly for firms under distress.
The latter two essays add to the literature on the demand for accounting
conservatism and present the impact of capital structure decisions on firm
reporting behaviors. Conservatism is a field that has gained considerable interest
since the publication of the paper by Basu (1997). An excellent overview of
theories and empirical evidence is provided in Watts (2003a and 2003b). It is
important to note that the focus in this thesis is on the conditional form of
conservatism. The rationale here is that, since conservatism predicts recognition of
accounting losses on a more timely basis than gains, losses tend to me more
contemporaneous with stock returns than gains. This type of conservatism is
conditional in the sense that it depends on the information on the economic
outcomes (or future cash flows) of the firm, i.e. book values are written down
under bad circumstances but are not written up under good circumstances.
Examples include lower of cost or market inventory accounting and impairment
accounting. This notion of asymmetrical timeliness in gain and loss recognition is
also reflected in the accounting of accruals, which is the key measure of
conservatism in this volume. Gains tend to be more persistent than losses because
unverifiable increases in asset values (gains) are not recognized at the time they
occur but over future periods as actual cash flows are realized; losses on the other




produces an asymmetry in accruals as losses are fully accrued while gains are not.
Therefore, periodic and cumulative accruals tend to be negative, leading to
negatively skewed distributions of accruals as immediate recognition of losses
generate more large accruals than gains.
There are two main theories in the literature on the investors’ demand for
conservatism. The dominant one, namely the debtholder demand view, suggests
that conservatism serves to increase debt contracting efficiency, as timely loss
recognition plays a crucial role in triggering ex-post violations of debt contracts
and therefore facilitates the transfer of control to the lenders following economic
losses (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts, 1993, 2003a; Ball, 2001). The
shareholder demand view, on the other hand, argues that conservatism is a
governance mechanism that reduces managers’ ability to manipulate financial
performance for their own benefit and thus increases the firm’s cash flows and
value (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Taking into account the role of conservatism in
debt contracting and governance, a study of firms’ reporting behaviors becomes
especially complex as well as relevant during the global financial crisis, which
could asymmetrically affect the demands of debt and equity investors.
The conservatism analyses in this thesis contribute to the literature in three
ways. First, by analyzing accounting choices companies make around important
capital raising events, we provide additional empirical evidence to the role of debt
and equity demand for conservatism. Second, we are the first to investigate how
the financial crisis affects firms’ reporting decisions. The last point relates to data.
The studies of the US and international conservatism (in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4,
respectively) are both based on a large datasets spanning more than 20 years. This
enables us to examine not only the presence of conservatism but also its timing.
Compared to the prominent comparative works by Ball et al. (2001) and Ball et al.
(2008), the data underlying the research in this thesis are better in terms of




1.1 Blockholder Leverage and Payout Policy
This chapter focuses on dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance their
blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We chose to carry out our
analysis in France for a number of reasons. First, it is well documented in
corporate governance literature that French firms are characterized by a high
concentration of ownership in the hands of families as well as a significant
separation of ownership and control (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,
1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Pyramids are prevalent and typically serve the
purpose of organizing blockholdings in single-firm companies. Another unique
feature of French corporate ownership is that it is not uncommon for blockholders
to fund their stakes in public companies with debt. The French institutional
framework also forms an ideal setting for this study. Since dual-class shares are
prohibited and the double voting rights arrangement is not very flexible because of
its time duration constraint, pyramids stand as the only reliable means of
separation. Additionally, in terms of the significance in the capital markets, French
holding companies make up a considerable portion of the country’s major equity
index, and are generally characterized by a complex ownership structure
(Banerjee, Leleux and Vermaelen, 1997).
In our investigation, we focus on the link between blockholders’ debt
exposure and the dividend payout policy in times of crisis, when the need of the
dominant owner for cash dividends to service debt may influence corporate
decisions. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in
particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France
where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in pyramidal
holding companies and study the effect of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. We
find no difference in payout policy and financial behavior during the 1999 to 2008




2009 to 2011 following the crisis, dividend payouts increase in proportion to
pyramidal debt of dominant owners. We inspect pyramidal entities individually
and find that on average only 60% of dividends are passed through to the ultimate
owners, with the rest predominantly used to meet debt service obligations of the
pyramidal entities.
1.2 Do firms anticipate security issues by conservative reporting?
In this chapter, we examine the importance of debtholders’ and shareholders’
concern for conservative accounting. We use the concept of conditional
conservatism and study a firm’s reporting behavior around important capital
structure decisions, i.e. debt and equity issues. We employ a large sample of US
debt and equity issues, which allows us to investigate the timing of conservatism.
Our results show that firms issuing equity exhibit increasing conservatism in the
period preceding the issue, driven by the demand of shareholders in the public
markets. This finding is consistent with the notion that managers signal credibility
to the market in an attempt to improve issue terms. The analysis provides no
significant results for debt issues or private equity deals, therefore reducing the
importance of the role of financial reports in debt contracting or as a governance
mechanism.
1.3 International comparison of accounting conservatism
The final chapter stays on the topic of accounting conservatism, although the focus
is on the international aspect of it. I first set out to investigate how the issuance of
debt and equity affects the demand for conservative accounting in different
countries. Using the Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) asymmetrical timeliness
model with an extensive dataset consisting of more than 540,000 firm-year




reporting quality of corporates around the world. Losses are generally recognized
in accruals more timely than gains, especially in the more advanced economies,
while companies in the developing countries exhibit less conservative reporting.
When debt and equity issues are considered in the analysis, the results provide
empirical support for the shareholders’ demand view in a number of countries.
Temporal effects are also observed, as companies reporting behavior (referring
specifically to the asymmetrical timeliness of loss recognition) changes over time,
especially around the financial crisis.
In the second part of the study, I assess the extent to which the aggregate
conservatism observed in each economy can be explained by the institutional and
market factors of the various countries. Based on the weighted least square
method, the results indicate that conservatism is associated not only with the legal
origin of the counties but also their institutional factors (in terms of protection of
creditor rights as well as investor rights). With respect to the effect of
shareholders’ and debtholders’ demand on conservatism, the country-level
analysis shows only limited support for the debt market demand, in contrary to the
main results of Ball et al. (2008).
1.4 Statement of contributions
This section describes my statement of contributions to the studies in this
dissertation as well as my acknowledgement of the contributions of others.
Chapter 1: This is my own independent writing.
Chapter 2: The idea of studying of French pyramidal structures originated in the
early 2000s and was developed by my three co-authors as well as another
researcher, Gerard Mertens. I joined the research project during my ERIM
Research Master in Business and Management (Finance track) and was primarily
involved in reviewing the literature as well as the collection and programming of




Pyramids: A Study on the Existence and Complexity of Pyramidal Ownership
Structures in France’, which described and empirically analyzed pyramidal
ownership in France. Later on during my PhD years, I rejoined the project, at
which point the direction of the research had changed thanks in no small part to
the advent of the global financial crisis. Over the years, I was mainly responsible
for data gathering, programming, coding of the variables, performing the analyses
and interpreting the results. In addition, I also had a role in the discussions on the
positioning of the paper as well as research design.
Chapter 3: This chapter is based on Anantavrasilp, S., M. J.P. Lubberink & C.
Huijgen, 2020, ‘Do firms anticipate security issues by conservative reporting?’ In
the initial version of this paper, my contributions were in the research design, data
work and carrying out the regression analyses. The revision of the paper into its
current form – which involved incorporating the impact of the global financial
crisis, developing new hypotheses, extending the dataset, executing the analyses
and updating the writing – is primarily my work.
Chapter 4: This chapter is built upon the main idea of Chapter 3, as I extended a
similar approach to investigate the impact of debt and equity issues on
conservatism in the United States to other countries in the first part of the paper. In
any case, I developed the research and wrote the final chapter independently.




Blockholder leverage and payout policies: Evidence from
French Holding Companies1
2.1 Introduction
Blockholders sometimes use leverage to finance their dominant equity stake in
publicly listed companies. This paper explores the use of private leverage by
___________________________________________________________
1 This chapter is based on Anantavrasilp, S., A. de Jong, D. DeJong & U. Hege, 2020,
“Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies,”
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 47, 253-292. We are grateful for helpful
comments from Nittai Bergman, Eli Berkovitch, Henrik Cronqvist, Ingolf Dittmann, Edith
Ginglinger, Ronen Israel, Meziane Lasfer, Erik Lie, Roni Michaely, Giovanna Nicodano,
Urs Peyer, Kristian Rydqvist, T.J. Wong, and Yishay Yafeh and from an anonymous
referee, as well as from seminar participants at Aalto, CUHK, ESMT, HEC Paris, IDC
Herzliya, Tilburg University, and at various conferences. An earlier version (based on a
different sample period prior to the global financial crisis) was circulating under the title
‘Blockholders and Leverage: When Debt Leads to Higher Dividends’. The authors
acknowledge excellent research assistance from Mounir Bendouch. Douglas DeJong
thanks the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and CentER, Tilburg
University for their support. Ulrich Hege thanks the European Research Council, ERC FP7
grant No. 312503‐SolSys, the ANR, grant ANR‐17‐EURE‐0010 under the
Investissements d'Avenir program, and TSE‐P for funding.
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controlling shareholders and the effects of this leverage on company policies,
dividends and investment. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not
been addressed before.2 The extensive literature on the role of blockholders
implicitly assumes that owners use deep pockets to finance their controlling share
blocks; blockholders, however, use debt financing for a number of reasons, such
as wealth limitations or tax optimization.3 The use of blockholder leverage, in
hidden or transparent form, has recently come under scrutiny in a number of high-
profile cases. For example, Casino, one of the largest French food retailers, was
under attack by short sellers since 2018 over concerns about high leverage in its
pyramidal holding companies, forcing it to sell assets and to seek limited
bankruptcy protection in May 2019 (Financial Times, 31 July 2019). Other French
groups also made headlines in recent years over blockholder leverage,4 as did
___________________________________________________________
2 Dou, Masulis, and Zein (2019) show that insider share pledging may lead to reduced risk-
taking.
3 For example, according to court filings, Ronald S. Lauder, the owner of a large block in
cosmetics and fashion group Estée Lauder Companies, uses debt apparently for tax
motives: “Nearly $400 million of that stock [worth $600 million] is pledged to secure
various lines of credit. Many financial planners consider it imprudent for principal
shareholders in a company to borrow against their stock. But it remains a popular way for
wealthy taxpayers to get cash out of their holdings without selling and paying taxes” (New
York Times, Nov. 26, 2011).
4 In August 2019, the controlling blockholder’s shares in publishing and retail
conglomerate Lagardère were reportedly worth less than the personal bank loans secured
by them (Financial Times, 27 August 2019). When Carrefour, a large multinational
retailer, experienced floundering sales in 2011, observers urged it to cut its dividend, but
Nomura analysts cautioned: “Since Carrefour’s core shareholders’ (Blue Capital)
investment in Carrefour is 80 percent debt financed, we question whether they can accept a
sharp reduction in dividend.” (Reuters November 17, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/us-carrefour-analysis-
idUSTRE7AG0M220111117). Telecom operator Altice, owner of Cablevision and other
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companies in other jurisdictions including the U.S., even though the institutional
context is often substantially different from that explored in our paper. 5
In our investigation, we focus on the link between blockholders’ debt
exposure and the dividend payout policy in times of crisis, when the need of the
dominant owner for cash dividends to service debt may influence corporate
decisions. We find that, in difficult times, companies exposed to blockholder
leverage are reluctant to cut dividends.
Data availability presents a major challenge given the privacy of
information on personal debt, despite a renewed regulatory interest to understand
the consequences of debt financing (Financial Stability Board, 2015). We focus on
France because much of the leverage of large shareholders is in fact structured in
holding vehicles. France’s specific institutions and personal tax rules convey
considerable advantages if levered owners organize their leverage in these holding
companies. Tax costs of using holding companies are negligible, and tax rules
discourage the use of pyramidal mixed companies that combine financial holdings
with operating investments. Furthermore, holding companies are quite transparent,
i.e., we observe ownership structure, financial structure and payout policy of
privately-owned as well as publicly listed companies, including holding
companies. Thus, while we cannot observe the use of private leverage
US assets, came under duress in 2017 over concerns about its leverage and the use of
blockholder leverage by its founder.
5 Examples include Steinhoff International of South Africa, engulfed in an accounting
scandal in 2017 that led to a 90% share price drop and a fall in the value of the largest
shareholder’s equity to 25% of the blockholder loan; WorldCom whose CEO Bernie
Ebbers had repeatedly used margin loans on his personal equity before the company
collapsed in 2001; Portuguese bank Espirito Santo that similarly collapsed in 2014; and
Chinese manufacturer Geely when it acquired a large equity block in Daimler-Benz in
early 2018 on margin loans.
Chapter 2: Blockholder leverage and payout policies
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comprehensively, fiscal incentives and the relative transparency of holding
vehicles provide a starting point to investigate its consequences. In France, a large
majority of listed firms are controlled by dominant owners, as is the case in a
majority of countries (e.g., LaPorta, Lopez-di-Silanes, Shleifer, 2000; this
observation does not hold for the U.S., the UK, and certain other countries).
We begin by carefully mapping the use of pyramids and pyramidal
leverage, our proxy for the use of private leverage by controlling blockholders. A
majority of listed companies are characterized by shareholder concentration. We
find that a majority of publicly listed companies are organized as pyramids. We
show the phenomenon of pyramidal debt to be wide-spread: a majority of
pyramidal holding companies use some (albeit moderate) leverage, and pyramids
lead to a mean increase of the dominant owner’s leverage exposure by 12.1% or
35.2%, depending on which of our two measures of pyramidal leverage is used.
On the whole, we find that the use of pyramidal debt is wide-spread, but that
blockholder leverage on average is moderate.
We then investigate the impact of blockholder leverage on dividend
payouts. We do so in two steps. We first analyze dividend payouts in our panel by
focusing on the cross-sectional comparison, controlling for all the usual variables
that are known to influence payout, and then look at the shock of the financial
crisis starting in 2008. In our first investigation, the cross-sectional panel study
prior to the financial crisis, we find no difference in payouts between companies
with levered blockholders and those without blockholder leverage. This finding
may be due to the fact that French holding companies overall make a relatively
conservative use of leverage, according to our data. From a strict econometric
point of view, this finding offers reassurance that we are looking at similar sets of
firms in the treatment and control sample when exploring the crisis impact. An
important caveat is that controlling blockholders could also use other sources of
personal income that we do not observe service to pay for holding company debt
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or their consumption, and not just the dividends received from the companies they
control (but we do not observe equity injections in holding companies that would
indicate such substitution effects).
However, we find strong support for the hypothesis that blockholder
leverage affects payout policy in difficult times. The 2008/2009 financial crisis
was an exogenous shock affecting the global economy in almost all developed
economies that led to severe cuts in dividend payouts in listed companies
worldwide and also in France (David and Ginglinger, 2016). Crucially, however,
the shock should affect companies differently according to the dominant
blockholder’s exposure to private blockholder leverage; we use this heterogeneous
intensity of reaction to the treatment (the financial crisis) for our identification.
We find that firms with pyramidal leverage maintain high dividend payouts even
when cash flows are plummeting and peers are cutting their payouts.
To look for additional evidence on the causal link between blockholder
leverage and the difference in crisis-induced payout behavior, we take a closer
look at the flow of funds within pyramids for additional evidence that payout
decisions are explained by pyramidal debt. Inspecting pyramids on an entity-by-
entity basis, we find that the fraction of dividends consumed in each holding
company and not passed on to the next entity increases strongly in our measures of
the importance of debt service in that holding company. Dominant owners
ultimately receive less than 60 percent of the cash that operating companies make
available to them, a fraction that decreases strongly in our measures of pyramidal
debt.
Finally, we consider the robustness of our finding and extensions. We
analyze the consequences of blockholder leverage for the real policies of the
company, but do not find that a dividend increase triggered in times of duress by a
blockholder’s leverage has a measurable effect on corporate investments or risk-
taking. We also demonstrate the robustness when using more conservative
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measures of pyramidal debt, explore Almeida and Wolfenzon’s (2006) theory of
dividend payouts in pyramids, and take into account double voting rights that in
France may considerably enhance the discrepancy between voting and cash flow
rights. None of these robustness checks alter our main findings.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to attempt to study the
impact of the private leverage of dominant shareholders via holding company debt
or similar vehicles. A similar issue arises when dominant owners use margin loans
where the equity stake serves as collateral (also known as insider pledging of
company stock), as our introductory examples show; unlike holding company
debt, however, these loans are rarely observable to researchers. Our paper is
related to various strands of the literature that we discuss in more detail in the next
section. It is obviously related to the large literature on payout policy, in particular
to work on payout policy in companies with dominant blockholders. This literature
is characterized by two conflicting hypotheses, expropriation vs. substitution. Our
paper adds to this literature with its analysis of the role of blockholders’ private
leverage. Our paper is also related to literature on payout policy and shareholder-
bondholder conflicts, in particular for firms close to financial distress. Our paper
contributes to this literature with the insight that the private leverage of
blockholders may exacerbate shareholder-bondholder conflicts in times of
financial distress. Finally, we contribute to the papers on financial structure and
payout policy in pyramidal structures with the insight that blockholder leverage
may be an important determinant of payout decisions in times of financial distress.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and
discusses our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the study’s design and data. Section
4 outlines our main results. Section 5 presents further evidence on how dividends
are passed through pyramidal entities. In Section 6, we look at various robustness
tests and extensions, and Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Literature and Hypotheses
We briefly discuss the various strands of the literature to which our paper is
related, on payout policy and blockholders, on shareholder-creditor conflicts under
financial duress, and on pyramids.
Regarding the role of blockholders in corporate payout policy, existing
work supports two contrasting views on the question whether the presence of large
owners should lead to lower or to higher dividend payouts compared with widely
held companies. The first view (sometimes referred to as the expropriation
hypothesis) argues that the level of payouts is lower since the dominant
shareholder gets only a fraction of the cash benefits compared with her exclusive
benefits of control over retained earnings. This effect should increase in the
discrepancy between control and cash flow rights (Burkart and Lee, 2008;
Claessens et al., 2002; Adams and Ferreira, 2008). There is substantial evidence
supporting this view (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000). In the alternative view, dominant
owners commit to a stable dividend level in order to offset market doubts about
expropriation risk. According to this view (dubbed the substitution hypothesis by
La Porta et al., 2000), the positive stock market value effect dominates the
potential benefits from retained earnings. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) present
empirical evidence supporting this view. In light of these ambiguous hypotheses
and tests, it seems fair to summarize that there is no dominant explanation on the
impact of ownership concentration on payout policy.
Our paper is also related to the literature on payout policy and
shareholder-creditor conflicts. According to standard capital structure arguments,
dividend payments can be used to expropriate wealth from debt holders by
increasing a firm’s net debt and hence making its debt riskier (Allen and Michaely,
2003). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) show empirical evidence that firms in
financial distress are reluctant to cut dividends. Chu (2017) finds that firms reduce
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dividend payouts when blockholders and important lenders internalize the
negative value effects that dividend payouts create for lenders and, hence, mitigate
shareholder-creditor conflicts.6 Chu (2017) also finds that this mitigation is
particularly pronounced when firms are in financial distress. Gilje (2016) presents
evidence, using exogenous leverage shocks following commodity price jumps in
the oil and gas industry, in particular, for purposes of identification, that firms with
heightened shareholder‐creditor conflicts following sudden leverage increases
take less risk in their capex spending.
In spite of our focus on corporate holding companies, the relationship of
our paper to the literature on pyramids is rather limited. In France, holding
companies are typically private vehicles of blockholders with assets typically
dominated by the equity stake in a single listed company; they exist for reasons
mainly based on taxes (see the next section) that seem to suggest that the presence
of a holding company can lead to higher dividend payouts.7 By contrast, the
literature on pyramids mainly focuses on diversified business groups or
conglomerates organized under umbrella holding vehicles. For example, Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that diversified business groups organize capital
accumulation through a listed holding company as a substitute for capital markets
with frictions, and argue that listed companies in such pyramidal structures are
___________________________________________________________
6 See also Brockman and Unlu (2009) for international evidence.
7 Holding companies can be used as a tax shelter shielding dividends from personal income
tax. Given tax neutrality of pyramids (as is the case in France), pyramidal structures can
then accommodate diverging dividend preferences: dividends can be paid to cater to
dispersed shareholders, while dominant owner with lower cash preferences can avoid
immediate taxation.
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likely to have lower payouts and retained earnings funding investments in other
business ventures.8
Besides the various strands of the literature discussed above, prominent
general theories on capital structure and corporate payouts provide guidance when
formulating hypotheses for our analysis of the payout consequences when
dominant owners use private leverage to fund their equity stakes, in particular
theoretical arguments on the role of debt to force companies to disgorge cash (e.g.,
Jensen, 1986) and the conflicts surrounding and consequences of financial distress
(e.g., Myers, 1977). The dominant shareholder must assure the solvency of her
holding vehicles, and she will use the dividend payout as a source of funding to
service her debt. As long as the dividends paid by the operating company are
sufficient to cover the owner’s pyramidal debt, pyramidal debt should not affect
payout policy. However, if the level of pyramidal debt is high, then we expect the
dominant owner to push for higher dividends. While this effect should be present
only for highly levered owners, we expect it be more widely observable in the case
of an adverse financial shock to the operating company. Then, leveraged
ownership creates a disparity between the dominant owner’s use of cash and the
needs of the company and other shareholders and potentially heightens
shareholder-creditor conflicts. Therefore, we postulate that dividend payouts
should increase in the use of pyramidal debt by dominant owners: Pyramidal debt
___________________________________________________________
8 There is relatively little prior work on payouts and capital structure in pyramids. Gopalan,
Nanda, and Seru (2007) show that in Korean business groups dividends are used to finance
investments in new subsidiaries. A small number of papers address the question how
business groups allocate debt between parent firms and subsidiaries (Bianco and Nicodano,
2006; Luciano and Nicodano, 2014) from the perspective of the internal capital market of
the group. Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) document that in business groups
wealth is transferred to controlling shareholders. None of these papers investigates the link
between pyramidal debt and dividends.
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has a positive effect on dividend payouts when operating company cash flow is hit
by an adverse financial shock.
2.3 Holding Companies in France: Background, Methodology and Summary
Statistics
2.3.1  Institutional Background on Holding Companies in France
France presents an ideal laboratory to investigate the role of pyramidal leverage in
the relationship between large and small shareholders. France is a developed
market, with the largest percentage of foreign stock ownership among the large
European economies, and with a high degree of ownership concentration in listed
firms. Structuring a large equity block in a holding vehicle, i.e. creating a pyramid,
offers several potential benefits for blockholders but entails little administrative
cost. As this institutional set-up suggests, pyramids are widely used and deeply
embedded.
According to the tax regime that has essentially been stable since 1965, a
holding company receives almost full tax credit for the corporate income tax paid
by the operating company or a subordinate holding vehicle, meaning that pyramids
in France are essentially tax neutral (so-called “régime des sociétés mères”). This
corporate tax credit, however, is conditional on holding the share block for at least
two years9 and on holding at least 5% of the equity (10% until 2000); thus, only
long-term investors that are significant shareholders benefit from the avoidance of
double taxation. The tax credit is only approximately complete because the
___________________________________________________________
9 A declaration of intent to hold the shares for more than two years is considered sufficient.
Breach of the declaration of intent through an earlier sale carries no other penalty besides
back taxes. Thus, the tax neutrality of a new blockholder is in practice effective
immediately and not after a two-year waiting period.
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administration costs of a holding company remain taxable, at a level of the true
administrative cost of the entity or 5% of its revenue, whichever is smaller. This
creates a tax incentive to keep the true administrative costs of holding vehicles at a
minimum and to structure them as pure financial holding entities unencumbered
by any real assets or activities that would lead to higher administrative costs and a
smaller tax credit. Thus, tax reasons can explain why holdings companies do not
typically consist of a portfolio of equity blocks and operating assets as is the case
in business groups that are prevalent in other countries.
Using a pyramid to structure an equity block offers several advantages in
France. First, if the large shareholder has issued some debt, structuring the debt in
a holding company allows the interest expense to be deducted against the dividend
payouts that are subject to personal income taxes. Thus, the prevailing tax regime
suggests that large share blocks financed with debt will be organized in pyramids.
Second, pyramids decouple the decision of a listed operating company to pay
dividends from the decision of a large blockholder to receive the dividend. That is,
blockholders can use pyramidal holdings as a tax shelter; they will only incur the
corresponding personal income tax on dividends when the dividends received by
the holding company are later transferred to the ultimate owner. Therefore, since
holding companies are neutral regarding corporate taxes, increasing the use of debt
in a pyramid procures no tax savings, neither for personal nor corporate taxes.10
Third, holdings are the only practicable way in France to engineer a disparity
between voting and cash flow rights. For all practical purposes, dual class shares
are not allowed. France allows double voting rights for long-term investors, but
their role is different and their impact limited, as our robustness results for double
___________________________________________________________
10 That is, the same tax advantage can be achieved by simply sheltering dividends in
holdings, without using debt. On the other hand, conditional on using personal debt, it is
tax-efficient to structure it as pyramidal debt.
Chapter 2: Blockholder leverage and payout policies
____________________________________________________________
20
voting rights show (see Section 6.4). In addition, holding companies jointly held
by multiple blockholders, such as family members, provide a vehicle for the
multiple blockholders to vote as one block in corporate decisions.
Finally, French regulations require all companies, public and private, to file
their unconsolidated financial statements on an annual basis. French regulations
also require all companies, public and private, to register their list of important
shareholders and listed companies to disclose important changes in shareholdings
and their holding structure.11 Thus, the ownership structure, financial structure and
payout policy of privately-owned as well as publicly-listed companies, including
holding companies, are accessible.
2.3.2  Measures of Pyramidal Leverage and Control
In this section, we present a simple example to introduce our key variables for
debt and control. Pyramids can be complex and France is no exception. Appendix
A presents a full description of the design and algorithms that address cross-
holdings and parallel ownership chains.
___________________________________________________________
11 Per French corporate laws, the following key thresholds give rise to discontinuous
changes in control rights: 1) 33%: This level of control grants veto rights. It also triggers
the mandatory bid rule, i.e. any owner passing through the 33% threshold is required to
launch a full and unrestricted takeover offer; 2) 40%: Control is presumed if one
shareholder has at least 40% of voting rights, directly or indirectly, and is the largest
shareholder (according to article 355-1 of French securities law per Bloch and Kremp,
2001); 3) 50%: This level constitutes majority voting rights (or legal control) and triggers
notification to the French authorities; 4) 67%: Reverse of the 33% rule, i.e. the ability to
block any veto rights by other shareholders. This level is also the highest conditional
takeover offer allowed under French law (restricted offers are not allowed in France).
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Figure 2.1: Stylized example
Stylized example in which Ms. X holds a 70% equity stake in HoldCo2, HoldCo2 holds a
60% stake in HoldCo1, and HoldCo1 holds a 30% stake in OpCo. HoldCo2 is financed
with 80% equity and 20% debt, HoldCo1 with 65% equity and 35% debt, and OpCo with
90% equity and 10% debt.
The Figure 2.1 example features an operating company, two holding
companies and a dominant owner. All entities in the pyramid are vertically
aligned, and the two holding companies have no other assets. Ms. X dominates the
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companies: HoldCo1 owns 30% of OpCo; HoldCo2 owns 60% of HoldCo1; and
Ms. X owns 70% of HoldCo2. Ms. X’s cash flow rights are conventionally
measured by the product 0.7 ∙0.6 ∙0.3 = 0.126, her claim on OpCo’s dividends. In
measuring control rights, we apply the same product rule but convert majority
stakes, 0.6 and 0.7, to full control, i.e. 1.0. Thus, her control rights are 1.0 ∙1.0 ∙ 0.3
= 0.3. The measure of the disparity between control rights and cash flow rights
that we call the control wedge is the ratio of control rights/cash flow rights,
calculated as 0.3/0.126 = 2.38.
Our focus is on the dominant owner’s exposure to leverage in the various
entities of the pyramid. We use two measures to aggregate the leverage throughout
the various entities of the pyramid. We explain the two measures using our
example. HoldCo1 is financed with 35% debt and 65% equity and HoldCo2 is
financed with 20% debt and 80% equity. OpCo itself is 10% debt-financed. We
denote the leverage ratio in pyramidal entity k by lk, so that in our example l0 =
0.1, l1 = 0.35 and l2 = 0.2. In this setting, OpCo needs to pay a sufficient dividend
so that HoldCo1 and HoldCo2 can service their debt. Ms. X’s effective claim on
OpCo’s cash flows is reduced as a consequence.
Focusing on holding company debt, our first measure of pyramidal
leverage, which we call average leverage, is just the mean leverage ratio of all the
holding entities in the pyramid. In the example, we have an average leverage of
(0.35 + 0.2)/2 = 0.275. More generally, if the pyramid consists of n holding




Our second measure, equivalent leverage, is motivated by the concern that
average leverage may underestimate the dominant owner’s true debt exposure.
Such is the case when several levered holding companies are vertically
superimposed on the operating company, as in our example. Ms. X’s cash flow
profile from her stake in OpCo is successively exposed to the leverage in the
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pyramidal layers. Equivalent leverage determines the leverage ratio that would
give Ms. X the same cash flow profile if she were to hold her stake in OpCo and
her pyramidal debt in a single levered holding company. In our example,
equivalent leverage is calculated as l0 + (1 - l0 )l1 + (1 - l0 )(1- l1)l2 = 0.1 + (1 -
0.1) ∙ 0.35 + (1 - 0.1) ∙ (1 - 0.35) ∙ 0.2 = 0.532. 12 Thus, this computation
aggregates Ms. X’s full leverage exposure in the entire pyramid. More generally,
if the pyramid consists of n vertically stacked holding companies, k = 1, 2, …, n,
equivalent leverage is defined as l0 + (1 - l0) l1 + (1 - l0) (1 - l1)l2 + (1 - l0) (1 -
l1) (1- l2)l3 + … + (1 - l0)(1 - l1) ∙ …∙ (1- ln-1)ln. Equivalent leverage collapses
the dominant owner’s pyramidal leverage to a single leverage ratio, by
hypothetically reallocating all debt in the pyramid to a single entity, the operating
company (and assigning zero leverage to all holding companies), in such a way
that the ultimate owner’s effective exposure to leverage is measured equivalently
to the actual combined leverage of the pyramid structure (or of the dominant chain
of control in case of multiple chains).
We have missing information on the capital structure for 32.7% of the
reported pyramidal holding companies, with a marked increase in the second half
of the sample period, due to an increase in foreign-based holding companies and
lower compliance. When calculating the values for the two measures of pyramidal
debt, we assume that the leverage in a holding company in the pyramid
corresponds to the average of the holding companies in the same pyramid when no
___________________________________________________________
12 For an intuition for the logic behind equivalent leverage, let rD be the cost of debt
(assume rD is the same for all entities in the pyramid). If OpCo pays a dividend yield of x,
then HoldCo1 receives 0.3 ∙ x and, after paying interest, has earnings (ROE) of 0.3(x –
l1rD). If HoldCo1 pays out all of its earnings as dividends, then HoldCo2 receives
0.6*0.3(x – l1rD) and, after paying interest, has earnings (ROE) of 0.6 ∙ 0.3(x – l1rD – (1-
l1)l2 rD). If all of it is paid out, the dominant owner receives 0.7 ∙ 0.6 ∙ 0.3(x – l1rD – (1- l1)l2
rD), whereas she would receive 0.7 ∙ 0.6 ∙ 0.3 ∙ x if there was no pyramidal debt.
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such data are available. Thus, our procedure ensures that the treatment of missing
observations is neutral for our estimates of both leverage measures, average and
equivalent.
2.3.3  Data and Variables
Our starting point is the set of all publicly listed companies on Euronext Paris as
of December 31, 2012. Our initial sample includes firms from all three tiers of the
Paris market, about 1,170 companies. We then impose the filter that each company
be continuously included in the WorldScope database over the period 1999-2011.
This criterion substantially reduces our sample; the final sample consists of 240
firms. We refer to each of these publicly listed companies as an operating
company. Next, we collect the complete ownership information in every year for
all holding companies, public and private. This information is available from the
Dafsaliens database that also documents validation dates (Dafsaliens was set up by
large French financial institutions to provide precise ownership information).
Starting from the operating company, we use Dafsaliens to trace the ownership of
the owners of the operating company and continue this process until we have
traced the entire ownership structure to the dominant owners. We trace ownership
across all ownership classes, individual/family, public company, unlisted private
company and state..
In accordance with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999),
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002) and others, we
require that a shareholder possess a substantial level of control (i.e. voting rights)
in order to qualify as a dominant owner. The typical threshold used in the
literature is 20%. To be consistent with the literature and allow comparisons with
prior findings, we use the same 20% threshold in our baseline. In each operating
company, we verify whether the largest ultimate owner exceeds this threshold. If
no shareholder has a control right stake of 20% or more, the company is
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considered as widely held. Otherwise, we identify the ultimate owner with the
largest control right stake and we refer to this ultimate owner as the dominant
owner.
We capture the discontinuous character of control rights by using concepts
similar to those adopted in Almeida et al. (2011) and assume the dominant
shareholder has absolute control over the operating company if she has a majority
of votes. That is, we convert effective control rights of greater than 50% in any
entity into full control of 100%. The other stakes are then allocated zero control
rights. Again, more complex cases with several control chains are discussed in the
Appendix A.
From the Diane database (the French component of Bureau van Dijk’s
Amadeus database), we collect the unconsolidated financial statements for private
unlisted and for listed companies in the ownership chain for 1999 to 2011. The
unconsolidated financial data provided by Diane eliminates the effect of group
debt and focuses the analysis on the capital structure of the firm itself. For the
sample of 240 operating companies, we use their consolidated financial statement
information from WorldScope.13
The richness of the Dafsaliens and Diane information offers an important
advantage over annual report-based data and company handbooks used in most
previous works such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and
Faccio and Lang (2002), which cover only ownership information of public
companies.
___________________________________________________________
13 If any of the 240 companies control subsidiaries, the net financial position of the
subsidiaries and operating company is reflected in the operating company’s consolidated
financial information.
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2.3.4  Firm Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Pyramids
Table 2.1 describes summary statistics of ownership structure and firm
characteristics of the 240 French operating companies, yielding 2,880 observations
in our 2000-2011 window (dropping 1999 as the regressions use lagged variables),
of which 2,160 before the crisis and 720 after the outbreak of the crisis.14 We find
that in the pre-crisis period 2000-2008, only 26.1% of operating companies are
widely-held, and 73.9% of the firms have a blockholder who satisfies the inclusion
threshold of 20%. Moreover, in 44.9% of our pre-crisis sample, dominant
shareholders use pyramids to control the operating company. This high frequency
of pyramid-controlled firms, substantially higher than the 26% frequency that La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) report
for France, is explained by the inclusion of private holding companies. By
contrast, earlier studies on pyramids in France classify firms as pyramids only if at
least one of the holding companies in the pyramidal structure was a public
company.15 We find that only less than one quarter of pyramidal structures contain
a public company (not reported in tables). While perhaps an inevitable restriction
in cross-country studies, limiting the pyramid definition to only structures with
listed holding entities leads to a substantial undercount of the use of pyramids in at
least the case of France.
Dominant owners are classified by type in Table 2.1 (individual/family,
firm, and state and others). Approximately forty-eight percent of operating
___________________________________________________________
14 In order to describe the longer term developments after the crisis, Table 2.1 also includes
the 2012-2014 and 2015-2017 descriptives of the 720 firms in the post-crisis sample.
15 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999); Faccio and Lang (2002); Ginglinger
and Hamon (2012).
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companies are controlled by either a family or an individual, roughly in line with
earlier studies. Corporate owners comprise 17.2% of dominant owners in the pre-
crisis sample.
Table 2.1 also provides an overview of key financial characteristics for the
companies in our sample, broken down by type of control and owner, which
allows us to see whether firms are comparable across ownership types. In terms of
size, measured by total assets, widely-held firms are only slightly larger than firms
with dominant owners, and they have about the same sales growth rate as block-
owned firms, whereas companies in pyramids have slower growth. Widely held
firms have somewhat higher operational risk and a higher frequency of loss years.
Capex spending and Tobin’s Q are comparable across all categories, as are cash
flows and return on assets. Leverage is defined as total debt obligations, scaled by
book value of total assets, with operating companies in pyramids having
marginally higher ratios. Sales growth is the two-year growth rate of sales. We
measure dividends relative to cash flow.16 Relative to the full sample, operating
companies with pyramidal ownership pay dividends comparable to those of
widely-held firms, slightly above the full sample means, and blockholder-
controlled firms without pyramids have lower dividend payouts. Comparing the
average dividends before and after the crisis for blockholder and pyramidal
ownership, Table 2.1 shows that the dividends scaled by firm size have decreased,
while a large fraction of cash flows have been paid out. The frequency of loss
firms and the level of operating risk are comparable across the crisis subsamples,
with operating companies in pyramids slightly lower. Pyramidal blockholder-
controlled firms are not different from other firms in terms of financial constraints
___________________________________________________________
16 We follow common practice and set payout ratios to unity when dividends are paid but
cash flow are negative or less than the dividend (e.g. Megginson and Von Eije, 2008).
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and their position in the firm life cycle (DeAngelo et al. (2006)’s variable retained
earnings/equity), but their stock market liquidity is lower (unsurprisingly for
concentrated ownership). The industry breakdown shows a wide mix of industries
in the full sample as well as in the subsamples of block owner-controlled and
pyramid-controlled operating companies. Overall, widely held firms, firms with
blockowners, and firms with blockowners using pyramids are roughly comparable.
2.3.5  Summary Statistics of Pyramidal Leverage
In Table 2.2, we present summary statistics for pyramid-controlled operating firms
(i.e., firms with a dominant blockholder exceeding 20% of ownership and a
pyramidal structure), for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods, and an analysis
of changes due to the onset of the crisis. We continue our analysis with a sample
of 970 firm-years in block-owned pyramids, for which we calculate the control
wedge as well as the two debt measures for the pyramidal structure. For this
sample, 34.4% of holding companies on average have missing data, and the
median holding company has no missing data.
We report an expansion of the summary statistics for the financial
characteristics shown in Table 2.1 for pyramid-controlled operating firms,
showing average, median, and standard deviation. Not surprisingly, sales growth,
capex, Tobin’s Q, cash flows all fall, and the frequency of losses rises
substantially and significantly with the onset of the crisis. As a consequence,
dividends as a fraction of total assets (our main measure) also fall, albeit with
weak significance, but not dividends when scaled by cash flows. Table 2.2 also
shows the dominant owner holds on average 37.5% of the equity (direct
ownership) in the operating company (median: 32.8%). Pyramidal structures
contain 2.64 layers on average with a median of 2. This measure includes the
operating company as a layer. The control wedge with a pre-crisis mean of 2.07
32
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(median: 1.667) measures the control-enhancing effect of pyramids as follows:
considering only equity stakes in the pyramidal structure, dominant owners own
1.07 times more voting rights on average than they hold cash flow rights, and it
changes little in the post-crisis period. Financial leverage increases with the crisis,
both as the standard leverage ratio (financial debt/total assets), and when measured
as Net debt/EBITDA.
Our two measures of pyramidal leverage consistently show that pyramidal
debt is wide-spread in France, but moderate in size on average. In line with the
leverage increase of the operating companies, we also find an increase from the
pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. Average pyramidal leverage, which measures
the mean debt-asset ratio in all holding companies across a pyramid, has a pre-
crisis mean value of 13.5% (16.7% post-crisis) but a pre-crisis median value of
only 2.1% (post-crisis 2.4%), reflecting a conservative capital structure. The
dominant owner’s total exposure to pyramidal leverage, however, is larger than
indicated by average leverage if several holding companies are vertically stacked.
This is the case in a large fraction of pyramidal firms (the average pre-crisis
number of layers of holding companies is 1.64, after subtracting the operating
company from the mean of 2.64 layers in total, increasing to 1.83 after the crisis).
Equivalent pyramidal leverage, our second measure, transforms debt to an
equivalent exposure, and provides a better view of the consolidated leverage
exposure of the dominant owner throughout the bottom company and vertical
chain of holding entities. The mean (median) pre-crisis equivalent leverage is
39.6% (36.7%), increasing to 45% (41.4%) post-crisis. In untabulated numbers,
we find that 25% of the controlling owners of pyramidal firms have a pre-crisis
equivalent pyramidal leverage measure of 57.9% or more. These numbers show
the use of leverage in pyramids is significant for some pyramid-controlled firms in
France. The distribution for our financial constraints, stock market liquidity and
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firm life cycle variables among pyramidal firms does not reveal any striking
patterns.
2.3.6  Stability of Pyramids and Pyramidal Debt
We investigate whether pyramids and pyramidal debt are persistent over time. We
start by collecting the evidence on the time variations in the presence of dominant
blockholders. If block ownership is endogenous it should dynamically adjust when
the firm’s conditions change.17 We inspect the rate of change in block ownership
by looking at the two-year changes and find that the ownership classification
(widely held, block-non pyramid, block-pyramid) does not change from one year
to the next for close to 90% of firms.
We also investigate whether pyramidal structures exhibit the same
persistence that we find for the dominant owners and their blockholdings. We find
that pyramids and their holding vehicles are stable over time. We draw a random
sample of 100 holding companies and investigate the year they were founded. On
average, the holding companies at the beginning of the sample period in 1999 are
already more than 30 years old, less than 10% were founded in 1990 or later, and
the oldest holding company was founded in 1865. The large number of companies
controlled by families (54.9% of the pyramidal firms versus 37.7% for the non-
pyramidal firms with a controlling blockholder, see Table 2.1) is one of the main
drivers of the longstanding nature of the relationship between dominant
blockholders and listed operating companies.
As a final verification, we consider the stability of pyramidal debt. While
the leverage ratio of pyramidal entities fluctuates from one year to the next, we
___________________________________________________________
17 See e.g. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Cronqvist and
Fahlenbrach (2009).
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find that the debt exposure of firms with high pyramidal leverage compared to
firms with little pyramidal leverage is persistent. To analyze the autocorrelation of
pyramidal debt, we sort our sample of firms with pyramid control into quartiles
according to their pyramidal leverage, using our two leverage measures. When
analyzing the persistence of their position relative to all pyramidal firms, we find
that, measured by equivalent leverage, 86% of firms remain in the same quartile of
pyramidal leverage exposure from one year to the next (73% when we consider
average leverage). This high persistence of firms’ pyramidal debt exposure is
useful for our identification strategy during the financial crisis.
2.3.7  Operating Company Debt and Pyramidal Debt
Finally, we explore the relationship between operating company debt and
pyramidal debt. While there is no literature on the capital structure of holding
companies with pyramidal debt, we do not expect pyramidal leverage and
company leverage to be correlated in a predictable way.18 We investigate the
correlation between operating company debt and pyramidal debt. We determine
the correlation coefficients between the company leverage and our two measures
of pyramidal debt (not tabulated in tables), and find no correlation of the
company’s leverage ratio with average leverage (ρ = - 0.06) and a low but
___________________________________________________________
18 Standard arguments suggest that if operating company debt is optimized, optimal
pyramidal debt should be zero if the dominant owner faces no wealth constraints. Wealth
constraints or other motives for pyramidal debt, however, are not obviously correlated with
operating company characteristics. Also, dominant owners in our sample are unlikely to
self-select to companies according to their risk characteristics or leverage, considering that
our blockholders are overwhelmingly families, corporations or government that typically
cannot be dissociated from the company history. We cannot rule out that the decision
whether to place debt in the operating company or in the pyramidal entities can make a
difference for some types of ultimate owners.
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reasonable positive correlation with equivalent leverage (ρ = 0.36), consistent with
our findings for operating company leverage in Table 2.3, Panel B. This result
holds also in untabulated regressions trying to explain the presence of pyramidal
leverage, in particular when including variables that typically explain leverage,
such as size, age, tangible assets or past profitability. To conclude, we are unable
to explain the choice of pyramidal debt from observable company characteristics.
That leaves only unobserved company characteristics, or characteristics of the
dominant owners themselves and their choices, as possible determinants of an
endogenous relationship between pyramidal debt and dividends.
2.4 Pyramidal Leverage and Payout Policy
2.4.1  Identification Strategy
Our main identification strategy relies on the crisis shock of the financial crisis of
2008/2009 as the basis for a difference-in-difference estimation with expected
heterogeneous local average treatment effects, using methodology formally
introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994). The crisis was unexpected and
pervasive but firms, when classified according to their exposure to pyramidal debt,
are expected to differ in their likely dividend response according to their degree of
exposure to pyramidal leverage. In other words, we exploit the fact that the shock
(the treatment) incurred during the financial crisis varies according to the
heterogeneous pyramidal leverage.
The fact that pyramidal holding companies and their debt levels are stable
over time and exhibit a low correlation with company leverage or other company
characteristics, is reassuring news from an econometric point of view: it allows us
to view the blockholder’s private leverage exposure as given and as quasi-
randomly assigned (conditional on all controls that we include) when the crisis
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arrives. Thus, the stickiness of pyramidal debt and the lack of correlation with
operating company characteristics appear to validate our approach.19
2.4.2  Ownership Structure and Dividend Payouts Before and After the Crisis
Table 2.3 presents the regression analysis for the dividend policy for all firms over
the entire sample period, 2000-2011. The purpose of this table is to investigate
whether the type of ownership structure matters for payout policy, and whether the
financial crisis of 2008 has an impact on this relationship. When analyzing the
impact of the financial crisis, we take into account that the crisis had an effect on
payout policy in France with a delay (David and Ginglinger, 2016), often
attributed to the importance of automatic stabilizers; by some measures, the depth
of the crisis was only reached in conjunction with the European sovereign debt
crisis starting in 2010. Therefore, we consider that the full impact of the crisis was
only felt in 2009 and sometimes even later. Indeed, dividends paid in Spring 2009
were still at relatively high levels. We define the dummy variable dPostCrisis that
takes a value of one for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 (company earnings in year
t are reflected in dividends in year t+1, and hence dividends are measured in the
following year). We focus on dividends scaled by total assets (Div/TA) as our
dependent variable. Our main findings are robust when using alternative measures
of dividend policy (see Table IA2.2 in the Internet Appendix).
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows in the first two lines that the dividend policy
of pyramid-controlled firms does not significantly differ from that of widely held
firms, whereas firms with blockholders but no pyramidal structure pay less
___________________________________________________________
19 The conditions of Imbens and Angrist (1994) for the validity of local average treatment
effects (relevance, exclusion restriction, (conditional) random assignment, monotonicity)
are satisfied.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of dividend payouts for all firms, 2000-2011
Panel A: Baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA
dBlock-owned pyramid -0.00152 -0.00178 -0.00200 -0.00152 -0.00178 -0.00200
(0.00308) (0.00326) (0.00318) (0.00307) (0.00325) (0.00317)
dBlock-owned non-
pyramid
-0.00552** -0.00549** -0.00586** -0.00542** -0.00539** -0.00575**
(0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00274) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.00268)
dBlock-owned pyramid ×
dPostCrisis
0.00571 0.00008 0.00037 0.00069 0.00024 0.00053
(0.00352) (0.00340) (0.00344) (0.00357) (0.00351) (0.00353)
dBlock-owned non-
pyramid × dPostCrisis
0.00158 0.00119 0.00146 0.00132 0.000957 0.00118
(0.00309) (0.00294) (0.00302) (0.00300) (0.00285) (0.00293)
Leverage -0.0204** -0.0204** -0.0197** -0.0179 -0.0181 -0.0172
(0.00891) (0.0101) (0.00999) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0119)
Leverage × dPostCrisis -0.00955 -0.00902 -0.00994
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0108)
Ln(Total assets) -0.00001 0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00003 --0.00005
(0.00050) (0.00050) (0.00052) (0.00049) (0.00049) (0.00051)
Cash and equivalents 0.00343 0.00243 0.00233 0.00339 0.00238 0.00227
(0.00738) (0.00718) (0.00713) (0.00738) (0.00717) (0.00713)
dLoss 0.00327 0.00456 0.00544 0.00349 0.00477 0.00567
(0.00387) (0.00441) (0.00459) (0.00376) (0.00429) (0.00448)
Operating risk 0.00126 0.0151 0.0217 0.00229 0.0162 0.0230
(0.0254) (0.0305) (0.0321) (0.0256) (0.0308) (0.0324)
Sales growth -0.00946** -0.0101** -0.00974* -0.00948** -0.0101** -0.00971*
(0.00473) (0.00493) (0.00498) (0.00472) (0.00490) (0.00495)
Tobin's Q 0.00965*** 0.00868*** 0.00841*** 0.00969*** 0.00872*** 0.00844***
(0.00338) (0.00320) (0.00316) (0.00340) (0.00322) (0.00318)
ROA 0.0948*** 0.104** 0.113** 0.0951*** 0.104** 0.113**
(0.0345) (0.0442) (0.0463) (0.0344) (0.0443) (0.0464)
Annual share turnover -0.00005 0.00096 -0.00006 0.00095
(0.000965) (0.00098) (0.00096) (0.00097)
Retained earnings / Total
equity
0.00448*** 0.00467*** 0.00454*** 0.00473***
(0.00147) (0.00151) (0.00149) (0.00154)
Year and industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,620 2,543 2,523 2,620 2,543 2,523
R-squared 0.244 0.241 0.247 0.245 0.241 0.247
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Panel B: Interaction with financial constraints variables in post-crisis period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA
Measure of financial
constraint Interest Coverage Ratio Net Debt / EBITDA Leverage Ratio
dBlock-owned pyramid -0.00212 -0.00207 -0.00262 -0.00261 -0.00240 -0.00238
(0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00295) (0.00295) (0.00286) (0.00286)
dBlock-owned non- -0.00435 -0.00429 -0.00646** -0.00646** -0.00619** -0.00618**
(0.00265) (0.00265) (0.00280) (0.00280) (0.00262) (0.00263)
dBlock-owned pyramid ×
dPostCrisis
0.00215 0.00129 0.00256 0.00228 -0.000165 0.000636
(0.00320) (0.00344) (0.00367) (0.00401) (0.00337) (0.00362)
dBlock-owned non-
pyramid × dPostCrisis
-0.000374 -0.00119 0.000741 0.000489 0.00131 0.00210
(0.00273) (0.00279) (0.00305) (0.00297) (0.00288) (0.00293)
Leverage -0.0107 -0.0105 -0.0260 -0.0262 -0.0197 -0.0199
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0168) (0.0169)
Leverage × dPostCrisis -0.00252 0.00243 -0.00930 -0.00684 -0.0115 -0.0211
(0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0153) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0185)
dLoss 0.00198 0.00237 0.00357 0.00361 0.00560 0.00555
(0.00354) (0.00359) (0.00381) (0.00380) (0.00443) (0.00443)
Annual share turnover 0.000901 0.000860 0.00188* 0.00187* 0.000922 0.00102
(0.000954) (0.000955) (0.00105) (0.00106) (0.000993) (0.00101)
Retained earnings / Total
equity
0.00453*** 0.00448*** 0.00455** 0.00456**
(0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00177) (0.00176)
Financial Constraint 0.00004 0.00004 0.000995** 0.00101*** 0.0048*** 0.0048***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.000380) (0.000382) (0.00152) (0.00152)
dConstraint × dBlock-
owned pyramid
-0.000697 -0.000871 0.00129 0.00125 0.00153 0.00156
(0.00187) (0.00189) (0.00348) (0.00350) (0.00402) (0.00403)
dConstraint × dBlock-
owned non-pyramid
-0.00141 -0.00163 0.00248 0.00245 0.00177 0.00176
(0.00215) (0.00213) (0.00415) (0.00414) (0.00406) (0.00406)
dConstraint × dBlock-
owned pyramid ×
-0.00225 0.000414 -0.00507 -0.00412 0.00218 -0.00114
(0.00305) (0.00413) (0.00371) (0.00513) (0.00425) (0.00523)
dConstraint × dBlock-
owned non-pyramid ×
0.00232 0.00467 0.000551 0.00143 -0.000611 -0.00379
(0.00299) (0.00348) (0.00452) (0.00483) (0.00527) (0.00572)




Additional control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year and industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,338 2,338 2,237 2,237 2,523 2,523
R-squared 0.183 0.184 0.280 0.280 0.248 0.248
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This table shows regressions explaining the dividend payouts by the operating company for all firms.
The independent variable is Dividends over Total assets of the listed operating company. The
dummy variable dBlock-owned pyramid is equal to one if the company has a blockholder (control of
20% of more of shares in the operating company) and if the company’s ownership structure contains
at least one holding company. The dummy variable dBlock-owned non-pyramid is equal to one if the
company has a blockholder (control of 20% of more of shares in the operating company) but no
pyramidal holding company.
The dummy dPostCrisis is equal to one for the years 2009-2011. If the capital structure of a
pyramidal entity is unknown, its value is replaced by the average of all the holdings in the same
pyramid (in both measures of pyramidal leverage).
In Panel B, three variables of exposure to financial distress are added and their interactions with
dBlock-owned pyramid, dBlock-owned-no pyramid and dPostCrisis are reported. In columns (1) and
(2), the measure for financial distress is the interest coverage ratio; in columns (3) and (4), the
measure for financial distress is Net debt/EBITDA, and in columns (5) and (6), the measure for
financial distress is the Leverage ratio (Total (financial) debt over Total assets). In addition to the
variables of Panel A, the triple interaction terms dConstraint × dBlock-owned pyramid × dPostCrisis
and dConstraint × dBlock-owned non- pyramid × dPostCrisis are included. Six industry dummies
and year dummies are always included. Panel B includes the same set of variables as Panel A and
hence, in addition to the reported variables, the following control variables: Ln(Total assets), Cash
and cash equivalents, Operating risk, and Sales Growth. Since we include year dummies, the dummy
variable dPostCrisis for the three post-crisis years 2009-2001 is not included and only appears in the
interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. See
Tables 1 and 2 for all variable definitions.
dividends, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis of LaPorta et al. (2000)
(the prefix d denotes dummy variables in this and the following tables). When we
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows in the first two lines that the dividend policy
of pyramid-controlled firms does not significantly differ from that of widely held
firms, whereas firms with blockholders but no pyramidal structure pay less
dividends, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis of LaPorta et al. (2000)
(the prefix d denotes dummy variables in this and the following tables). When we
interact the dPostCrisis dummy with our variables for the presence of blockowners
or pyramids, we find that the dividend policy does not change between the pre-
crisis and the post-crisis period for the three ownership structures. This means that
companies with concentrated shareholdings or holding companies adjust their
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dividend policies in reaction to the crisis in exactly the same way as do widely
held companies.20
We also consider whether there is a different dividend reaction to the
crisis event for firms exposed to financial distress. In Panel B of Table 2.3, we use
three different measures of financial constraints: the interest coverage ratio used in
Chu (2017), the leverage ratio used in Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990), as
well as the variable net debt/EBITDA. We define firms to be in financial distress if
they belong to the most exposed quartile of sample firms for each of the financial
constraint measures (bottom quartile for the interest coverage ratio, and top
quartile for leverage ratio and net debt/EBITDA). The results are reported in Table
2.3, Panel B. Our focus is again on pyramidal firms with a blockholder. We find
that the triple interaction variable dConstraint × dBlock-owned pyramid ×
dPostCrisis, our measure of the post-crisis impact of the presence of financial
constraints, is not significant for any of our three financial constraint variables; we
conclude that pyramidal block ownership per se does not lead to a different
adjustment in dividend payouts after the crisis, even for firms that show signs of
financial distress.
To complete the discussion, the regressions in Table 2.3 (Panel A and B)
confirm that dividend policy depends on other variables: unsurprisingly, firms
with higher Tobin’s Q and higher profitability (ROA) pay higher dividends, and
firms with higher sales growth pay less dividends. We also confirm DeAngelo et
al. (2006)’s finding that dividends increase for firms capable of financing equity
from retained earnings rather than raised capital when including their suggested
life cycle variable retained earnings/total equity. Dividend payouts do not depend
___________________________________________________________
20 The regression include year and industry fixed effects, so the dummy dPostCrisis as a
primitive term would be redundant and hence is not included.
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on our measure of stock market liquidity (we report results using Banerjee et al.
(2007)’s first liquidity measure of annual stock turnover), or other control
variables included in the regression. Company leverage is not significant when we
control for post-crisis leverage (regressions (4) to (6)). Though not shown, the
regressions in the two tables load the same on our industry categories.
2.4.3Pyramidal Debt and Dividend Payouts Before and After the Crisis
We consider the impact of pyramidal debt on payout policies in Table 2.4,
presenting our main result that companies relying heavily on pyramidal debt
maintain substantial dividend payment levels after the crisis. We are particularly
interested in the question whether the crisis, as measured by the dummy variable
dPostCrisis, had an impact on the relationship between pyramidal debt and
dividend policy. Since we want to take a closer look at the financial structure of
the holding companies in pyramids, this table limits the attention to pyramid-
controlled operating firms, in contrast to Table 2.3 that looks at all firms. We show
results for our two measures of pyramidal leverage, average leverage (regressions
(1) to (3)) and equivalent leverage (regressions (4) to (6)). Table 2.4, Panel A,
documents that pyramidal debt per se, whether measured by average or equivalent
leverage, has no clearly significant effect for the dividend policy of the operating
company. The coefficient is slightly negative, but essentially insignificant (with
significance at the 10% level in only one out of six regressions). In these as in all
following regressions, we assume that the leverage in holding entities for which
we do not observe financial information is the same as for the observed entities of
the same companies (see Table 2.7 for the robustness when altering this
assumption).
Our identification exploits the fact that there should be a predictable
heterogeneous response to the crisis shock according to the exposure to pyramidal
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Table 2.4: Determinants of dividend payouts for pyramid-controlled firms
Panel A: Baseline regressions
Pyramidal leverage Pyramidal leverage (equivalent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA
Pyramidal Leverage -0.00748* -0.00664 -0.00665 -0.00490 -0.00347 -0.00348
(0.00440) (0.00468) (0.00468) (0.00553) (0.00564) (0.00570)
Pyramidal Leverage ×
dPostCrisis
0.0146** 0.0156** 0.0155** 0.0111* 0.0116* 0.0115*
(0.00716) (0.00733) (0.00725) (0.00659) (0.00656) (0.00656)
Leverage -0.0304*** -0.0321*** -0.0321*** -0.0265*** -0.0291** -0.0291**
(0.00901) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0112)
Leverage × dPostCrisis -0.00666 -0.00370 -0.00356 -0.0149 -0.0120 -0.0119(0.0129) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0174)
Ln(Total assets) 0.000769 0.000871 0.000868 0.000745 0.000847 0.000843
(0.000640) (0.000573) (0.000613) (0.000637) (0.000570) (0.000611)
Cash and equivalents 0.00131 -0.000252 -0.000266 0.00193 0.000694 0.000659
(0.00929) (0.00923) (0.00921) (0.00922) (0.00913) (0.00911)
dLoss 0.00857* 0.0104* 0.0104* 0.00853* 0.0104* 0.0105*
(0.00454) (0.00544) (0.00554) (0.00464) (0.00558) (0.00569)
Operating risk 0.0601 0.0615 0.0611 0.0584 0.0593 0.0591
(0.0438) (0.0483) (0.0488) (0.0433) (0.0478) (0.0484)
Sales growth -0.00145 -0.00166 -0.00166 -0.00113 -0.00133 -0.00134
(0.00335) (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00342) (0.00355) (0.00356)
Control wedge -0.00058** -0.00055* -0.00055** -0.00055 -0.00057* -0.00057*
(0.00026) (0.00028) (0.00027) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00033)
Tobin's Q 0.00821** 0.00642** 0.00641** 0.00814** 0.00631** 0.00631**
(0.00347) (0.00298) (0.00298) (0.00346) (0.00298) (0.00298)
ROA 0.135** 0.159** 0.159** 0.134** 0.159* 0.159*
(0.0589) (0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0597) (0.0812) (0.0812)
Annual share turnover -0.00126 0.000139 -0.00128 0.000110
(0.00201) (0.00207) (0.00210) (0.00215)
Ret. earnings/Total
equity
0.000362 0.000401 0.000545 0.000565
(0.00305) (0.00311) (0.00300) (0.00306)
Year and industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,172 1,121 1,120 1,172 1,121 1,120
R-squared 0.325 0.319 0.318 0.323 0.317 0.317
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Panel B: Interaction of pyramidal leverage and operating company financial constraints
Pyramidal leverage (average) Pyramidal leverage (equivalent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA
Pyramidal Leverage -0.00341 -0.00646 -0.00665 -0.00398 -0.00275 -0.00357
(0.00370) (0.00437) (0.00469) (0.00433) (0.00551) (0.00569)
Pyramidal Leverage ×
dPostCrisis
0.00845* 0.0209** 0.0160* 0.0111** 0.0148** 0.00989
(0.00511) (0.00978) (0.00820) (0.00523) (0.00732) (0.00622)
Leverage -0.0218*** -0.0346*** -0.0321*** -0.0187*** -0.0323** -0.0291**
(0.00754) (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.00647) (0.0137) (0.0112)
Leverage × dPostCrisis -0.00294 -0.00356 -0.00272 -0.00786 -0.0105 -0.0198(0.0133) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0145) (0.0216) (0.0236)
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.00007 0.00007
(0.00005) (0.00005)
dInterest Coverage














dLoss 0.00627 0.00874** 0.0104* 0.00645 0.00885** 0.0103*
(0.00417) (0.00432) (0.00558) (0.00418) (0.00440) (0.00577)
Control wedge -0.00058** -0.00064** -0.00055** -0.00062** -0.00075** -0.00055*
(0.00026) (0.00029) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00034) (0.00032)
Tobin's Q 0.00130 0.00567* 0.00640** 0.00131 0.00558* 0.00633**
(0.00215) (0.00302) (0.00298) (0.00215) (0.00302) (0.00299)
ROA 0.0962* 0.234*** 0.159** 0.0947* 0.234*** 0.158*
(0.0553) (0.0880) (0.0804) (0.0559) (0.0887) (0.0816)
Annual share turnover 0.00128 0.000764 0.000117 0.00127 0.000719 0.000281
(0.00179) (0.00250) (0.00209) (0.00182) (0.00260) (0.00225)
Ret. earnings/Total 0.00102 -0.00026 0.00036 0.00096 0.00021 0.00072
(0.00210) (0.00322) (0.00315) (0.00212) (0.00313) (0.00311)
Additional control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year and industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,042 1,006 1,120 1,042 1,006 1,120
R-squared 0.296 0.386 0.318 0.298 0.384 0.317
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Table 2.4 shows regressions explaining the dividend payouts by the operating company for firms
controlled by a pyramid. The independent variable is Dividends over Total assets of the listed
operating company. Pyramidal leverage is measured by average leverage in equations (1) to (3), and
equivalent leverage in equations (4) to (6) of each panel. Both panels include an identical set of
control variables. Panel A reports the full set of control variables except for the six industry dummies
(not shown). Panel B includes the same set of variables and hence, in addition to the reported
variables, the following control variables: Ln(Total assets), Cash and cash equivalents, Operating
risk, and Sales growth. If the capital structure of a pyramidal entity is unknown, its value is replaced
by the average of all the holdings in the same pyramid (in both measures of pyramidal leverage). Six
industry dummies and year dummies are always included. Since we include year dummies, the
dummy variable dPostCrisis for the three post-crisis years 2009-2001 is not included and only
appears in the interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for all variable definitions.
leverage. While the shock affects all firms, the dividend response to the shock
should be more mitigated for firms with blockholders exposed to pyramidal
leverage. Our approach is a difference-in-difference estimation of this differential
response to the crisis shock, measured by the interaction term between dPostCrisis
and our two measures of pyramidal leverage. The interaction term Pyramidal
leverage × dPostCrisis in Table 2.4, Panel A, is our main variable of interest.
We find a uniformly significant positive relationship between the interaction
term Pyramidal leverage × dPostCrisis in Panel A of Table 2.4 and dividend policy
in all specifications, with significance at the 5% level in 3 out of 6 specifications,
and at 10% in the three remaining equations. This is the main answer to our
research question; it says that, in order for dominant owners to be able to service
their private debts, companies with levered blockholders are willing to maintain
dividends in reaction to the crisis. For the interpretation, it should be kept in mind
that the financial crisis hit France with a delay.
We also consider whether the post-crisis dividend adjustment is different for
firms exposed to financial distress. In Table 2.4, Panel B, we report the results
when we interact the variable of interest Pyramidal leverage × dPostCrisis with
our three variables of financial distress, Interest coverage ratio, Leverage ratio and
Net debt/EBITDA. The triple interaction coefficient is negative as we would
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expect (meaning that firms more likely exposed to financial distress concerns are
less likely to maintain pre-crisis levels of dividends) but it is significantly negative
only for Net debt/EBITDA. Crucially, our main variable of interest Pyramidal
leverage × dPostCrisis remains positive and significant, meaning that companies
with leveraged blockholder cut their dividends by a significantly smaller amount
compared with other firms even when we explicitly include financial distress.
As a robustness check, we repeat all regressions in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 with
three-year lagged ownership measures instead of the one-year lagged ownership
measures that we use in all regressions reported in these tables. The results (not
reported in tables) are robust to this two-year lag.21 The stability of the ownership
structure and these extended lags imply that endogeneity of this variable is not
likely to induce biased estimates.
2.5 Anatomy of Dividend Pass-Through in Pyramidal Structure
For additional evidence on the transmission mechanism, we disaggregate and
investigate information for the flow of funds within pyramids. We inspect directly
the financial situation of each holding company, in particular its capital structure
and dividends. We consider specifically the utilization of the dividends that each
entity receives, and in particular focus on the fraction passed on to the next layer
in the pyramidal chain. Following our hypothesis, we postulate that this fraction
decreases in the entity’s debt. Thus, the fraction of dividends that is ultimately
passed on to the beneficial owner should decrease in the pyramidal debt exposure.
Specifically, we investigate the behavior and determinants of the dividend
pass-through, the dividends ultimately received by the dominant shareholder as a
___________________________________________________________
21 In a few instances the significance of the results becomes weak; this is a consequence of
the loss of power in our tests because we cannot use the first two years of our panel.
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fraction of the operating company’s dividends made available to him. Formally,
by dividend pass-through of the dominant owner, we refer to the fraction of the
dividends that the operating company makes available to the dominant shareholder
(through direct and indirect ownership links) that the dominant owner actually
receives. Thus, this fraction excludes the part of dividends absorbed somewhere in
the pyramidal chain.
Table 2.5 shows summary statistics for the holding companies of pyramid-
controlled companies, encompassing all holding companies for which we observe
financial information. We base our analysis on this sample (we present the
statistics for the smaller subsample of holding entities and associated operating
companies for which we have complete financial information on all holding
entities in the pyramid in the Internet Appendix, Tables IA2.3 and IA2.4). Again,
we show values for the pre-crisis and post-crisis period separately. Panel A
presents the summary statistics for all holding companies with observable
financial information. Total assets and the investment ratio (the fraction of the
holding entity’s assets that consists of its stake in the listed operating company) of
the holding companies remain stable between the pre-crisis and post-crisis period,
but debt and interest expenses rise whereas dividends received fall, measured as a
fraction of total assets, albeit mostly not significantly, indicating the potential for
heightened tension in the ability to service pyramidal debt. Indeed, the last two
lines of Panel A show a precipitous fall in the mean coverage of interest
obligations through dividend receipts: when we express dividends received as a
fraction of the proportional debt service obligation of the holding entity (interest
expense × investment ratio), we find that the fraction decreases by 43% from the
pre-crisis to the post-crisis period in our preferred version where outliers are
capped (investment ratio capped between 0 and 1, last line), and by 61% in the
raw data. However, this coverage ratio remains at relatively comfortable median
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levels of 3 (mean above 30) even after the crisis. Thus, we expect tensions to be
concentrated among companies at the top end of pyramidal debt.
Indeed, the picture changes when we split the sample to focus on companies
with the highest pyramidal leverage exposure. In Panel B, we consider the top
quartile of pyramidal holding companies by leverage (financial debt/total assets)
separately from the rest of the sample. We find that the coverage ratio dividends
received/(interest expense × investment ratio) is much lower for highly levered
firms, at median levels between 1.28 and 1.56 before the crisis (mean levels above
5). This indicates a clear potential for tensions for the most levered blockholders.
Remarkably, it remains stable or even increases (in the raw data) with the arrival
of the crisis, in strong contrast to the rest of the sample of moderately levered
pyramidal holding companies where the coverage ratio is much higher and falls
with the crisis. We find similar differences when we split the sample by other
measures of pyramidal leverage (not reported in tables).
Table 2.6 considers the determinants of dividend pass-through. Panel A
presents summary statistics, separate for the pre-crisis years 2000-2008 and the
post-crisis period starting in 2009. It shows that the mean (median) of the dividend
pass-through in our sample is 59.6% (66.4%), i.e. ultimate owners receive on
average less than 60% of the dividends made available to them. This proportion
increases to 70.7% on average (median: 83.4%) after the financial shock arrives,
perhaps indicating that the ultimate owners have additional cash needs after the
crisis that are not captured by the pyramidal debt in our sample, but the difference
is not significant.
Panel B presents the regression results. The dependent variable is the
dividend pass-through to the ultimate owner as a fraction of the dividends made
available to him. Our variable of interest is the measure of pyramidal leverage
(average leverage in regressions (1) and (3) and equivalent leverage in regressions
(2) and (4)), either as a contemporaneous measure (regressions (1) and (2)) or as a
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Table 2.6: Determinants of dividend passed through to dominant owners,
based on pyramidal leverage
Panel A: Summary statistics of dividend pass-through
Pre-crisis (2000-2008) Post-crisis (2009 -2011)
Mean Median # obs Mean Median # obs
Dividend pass-through (DivPassThrough) 0.5959 0.6636 527 0.7073 0.8338 146
Pyramid leverage (average), lagged 0.1217 0.0029 527 0.1300 0.0012 146
Pyramid leverage (equivalent), lagged 0.3794 0.3684 527 0.4071 0.3640 146
Number of layers 2.4573 2.0000 527 2.6370 2.0000 146
Proportion missing entities 0.3060 0.0000 527 0.3279 0.0000 146
Panel B: Regression analysis of dividend pass-through
Pyramidal leverage not lagged Pyramidal leverage lagged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DivPassThrough DivPassThrough DivPassThrough DivPassThrough
Number of layers -0.0710*** -0.0614*** -0.0767*** -0.0636***
(0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0108) (0.0147)
Pyramid leverage (average) -0.346** -0.283
(0.162) (0.179)
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) -0.278*** -0.267***
(0.0880) (0.0984)
Pyramid leverage (average) × 0.00794 -0.130
dPostCrisis (0.207) (0.216)
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) 0.196 0.101
× dPostCrisis (0.122) (0.120)
Observations 872 872 673 673
R-squared 0.145 0.143 0.173 0.174
This table analyzes the fraction of the dividends that the ultimate owner in a pyramid-
controlled company receives through the pyramidal structure, as a function of the
combined debt service obligation of the pyramidal layer(s). DivPassThrough (or dividend
passed through) is the fraction of the dividends that the operating company makes
available to the dominant owner that is eventually received by the dominant owner, i.e.
dividends received by the dominant owner / (dominant owner’s combined ownership in the
operating company × dividend paid by operating company). The measure of pyramidal
leverage of the pyramid of holding companies is average leverage in equation (1) and (3),
and equivalent leverage in equations (2) and (4). If the capital structure of a pyramidal
entity is unknown, its value is replaced by the average of all the holdings in the same
pyramid. If the capital structure of none of the holding companies can be observed,
pyramidal leverage is assumed to be zero (in both measures of pyramidal leverage). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. See Tables 2.1 and
2.2 for other variable definitions.
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lagged measure (regressions (3) and (4)). We focus on the number of pyramidal
layers and one of our two pyramidal leverage measures. In the pre-crisis period,
both measures of pyramidal leverage are significantly negative: a smaller fraction
of dividends received is passed through to the ultimate owner if the pyramid is
indebted (as a substantial part of dividends received by intermediate entities are
used to service the debt). When we use lagged pyramidal leverage terms (in
regressions (3) and (4)) to be more certain about the direction of causality, we find
the same result.
To gauge the impact of the crisis shock, we consider the interaction terms of
pyramidal debt with the dummy dPostCrisis. Since Table 2.4 shows that dividends
are increasing in pyramidal leverage, we expect that dividend policy may remain
the same and hence the relationship between pass-through and pyramidal leverage
may remain constant. Indeed, we find that the interacted terms are not significant,
meaning that the adjustment does not come at the ultimate owner’s expense;
ultimate owners seem to be able to receive payouts that are uncorrelated with their
pyramidal debt exposure.
Overall, our anatomy of the pass-through of dividends demonstrates that
ultimate owners receive on average only 60% of the dividends that the operating
company makes available to them, using the remainder mostly for debt service
payments along the pyramidal chain. These relationships hold in normal times.
The fact that the pass-through does not vary with pyramidal debt after the financial
crisis shock appears to be consistent with our earlier results in Table 2.4: if
companies do not cut their dividends because they cater to the needs for cash of
the dominant owner’s pyramidal leverage, then the use of those unchanged
dividends in the pyramid should not change, either. This finding is also consistent
with the hypothesis that pyramidal debt reinforces the pressure on operating
companies to increases their payout ratios when hit by adverse shocks.
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2.6 Extensions and Robustness
2.6.1  Real Effects of Blockholder Leverage Under Duress
When companies with levered owners increase dividends during times of financial
duress, negative real effects such as a cut in investments could be the
consequence. We investigate whether pyramidal debt has such a negative impact
on investments. We look at the full sample, and we also look at the subsample of
pyramid-controlled firm, where we focus on the impact of pyramidal leverage,
before and after the financial crisis. We find that neither before nor after the crisis
is there any significant change in investment that can be attributed to pyramidal
leverage. We do not tabulate these results, but include representative regressions
in the Internet Appendix (Table IA2.1).
Also in untabulated regressions, we investigate the determinants of various
measures of operational risk. We use the standard deviation of ROA, beta, and the
standard deviation and semi-deviation of market return, all measured over a rolling
5-year window (t-4 to t0). While one of our four measures, the volatility of ROA,
shows some association with pyramidal debt in the pre-crisis period, none of the
four measures of operational risk shows any change as a function of pyramidal
debt under the shock from the financial crisis. Our findings for investments and
risk appear to be consistent: overall, pyramidal leverage is probably too
conservative, and the effect leading to higher dividends too small to lead to a
measurable reduction in investment or change in risk.
2.6.2  Alternative Measures for Pyramidal Debt
We have no capital structure information for 34.4% of the reported pyramidal
holding companies, posing a challenge for the construction of our measures of
pyramidal debt. We investigate the robustness of our results when using the most
conservative assumption available for the capital structure of those holding entities
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with missing information. We now assume that, when calculating the values for
the two measures of pyramidal debt, there is zero debt in a holding company in the
pyramid when such data is not available, thereby presenting conservative
estimates for our two leverage measures, average and equivalent. By contrast, in
our main analysis, we assume that the leverage of those holding companies with
missing capital structure observation corresponds to the average of the holding
companies in the same pyramid when no such data is available.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present the results, reproducing our estimates of the
dividend model (Table 2.4) and the dividend pass-through (Table 2.6).
Importantly, the significance of the variables of interest, the interacted terms with
the post-crisis dummy, and the explanatory power of the regressions are robust to
this use of the most conservative measure of pyramidal leverage.
2.6.3  Alternative Explanations for Dividend Levels in Pyramids
Regarding alternative explanations, we consider first Almeida and Wolfenzon’s
(2006) theory stipulating that pyramids are used to create new businesses from
retained earnings, thereby taking minority investors hostage in the interest of
capital accumulation. Inspecting the asset base of holding companies, we find that
on average the investment in the company one layer below comprises 60% of the
total assets of the pyramidal entity (see Table 2.5, Panel A). With the stake in the
company below constituting over half of a typical holding company’s assets, it is
unlikely that French holding companies are predominantly used to accumulate
new investments in other subsidiaries. Further evidence emerges when we analyze
the relationship between dividends received and the uses for those dividends. If a
holding company absorbs dividends, i.e. receives dividends but does not pass them
on to the next layer, it will put them to one of three uses: (1) to pay debt service;
(2) to make investments; and (3) to save by increasing cash or paying down debt.
Performing correlation analyses with these three variables, we find that the
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Table 2.7: Determinants of dividend payouts for all firms - alternative
definition of pyramidal leverage
Pyramidal leverage,
missing = 0 Pyramidal leverage (average) Pyramidal leverage (equivalent)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA Div / TA
Pyramidal Leverage -0.00200 -0.00580 -0.00570 -0.00295 -0.00214 -0.00270
(0.00369) (0.00464) (0.00496) (0.00425) (0.00591) (0.00604)
Pyramidal Leverage ×
dPostCrisis
0.00685 0.0203** 0.0151* 0.0101* 0.0144* 0.00915
(0.00502) (0.00999) (0.00837) (0.00513) (0.00774) (0.00644)
Leverage -0.0216*** -0.0344*** -0.0318*** -0.0192*** -0.0326** -0.0294**
(0.00754) (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.00640) (0.0141) (0.0116)
Leverage × dPostCrisis -0.00294 -0.00378 -0.00253 -0.00725 -0.0103 -0.0195(0.0134) (0.0168) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0219) (0.0238)
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.00007 0.00007
(0.00005) (0.00005)
dInterest Coverage Ratio ×
Pyramidal Lev. × dPostCrisis
-0.00533 -0.00487
(0.00913) (0.00561)
Net Debt/EBITDA 0.000982* 0.00104*
(0.000554) (0.000547)
d(Net Debt/EBITDA) ×
Pyramidal Lev. × dPostCrisis
-0.0209** -0.00936**
(0.00918) (0.00466)




dLoss 0.00637 0.00889** 0.0106* 0.00657 0.00893** 0.0104*
(0.00415) (0.00433) (0.00557) (0.00417) (0.00439) (0.00576)
Control wedge -0.00059** - - - - -0.000567*
(0.000262) (0.000285) (0.000275) (0.000273) (0.000349) (0.000327)
Tobin's Q 0.00125 0.00562* 0.00635** 0.00127 0.00556* 0.00630**
(0.00214) (0.00302) (0.00298) (0.00215) (0.00302) (0.00299)
ROA 0.0968* 0.235*** 0.160** 0.0956* 0.234*** 0.159*
(0.0552) (0.0881) (0.0804) (0.0559) (0.0885) (0.0814)
Annual share turnover 0.00122 0.000774 0.00005 0.00119 0.000687 0.000220
(0.00178) (0.00249) (0.00208) (0.00181) (0.00259) (0.00223)
Ret. Earnings/TE 0.00104 -0.000243 0.000371 0.000978 0.000238 0.000763
(0.00210) (0.00322) (0.00314) (0.00212) (0.00310) (0.00309)
Additional control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year and industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,042 1,006 1,120 1,042 1,006 1,120
R-squared 0.296 0.386 0.318 0.298 0.384 0.317
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Table 2.7 reproduces the estimation of Table 2.4, Panel B, with an alternative measure of
pyramidal leverage: for both average leverage and equivalent leverage, instead of assuming that
missing holding entities have the mean leverage, we now conservatively set their leverage to
zero. Regressions explain the dividend payouts by the operating company for firms
controlled by a pyramid. The independent variable is Dividends over Total Assets.
Pyramidal leverage is measured by average leverage in equations (1) to (3), and equivalent
leverage in equations (4) to (6) of each panel. Both panels include the same set of
independent variables as does Table 4. The additional control variables not reported in the
Table are : Ln(Assets), Cash and cash equivalents, Operating risk, and Sales Growth. Six
industry dummies and year dummies are always included. Since we include year dummies,
the dummy variable dPostCrisis for the three post-crisis years 2009-2001 is not included
and only appears in the interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for all variable definitions.
Table 2.8: Determinants of dividends pass-through - alternative definition of
pyramidal leverage
Pyramidal leverage,
missing = 0 Pyramidal leverage not lagged Pyramidal leverage lagged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DivPassThrough DivPassThrough DivPassThrough DivPassThrough
Number of layers -0.0716*** -0.0610*** -0.0765*** -0.0621***
(0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0107) (0.0148)
Pyramid leverage (average) -0.354** -0.330*
(0.167) (0.187)
Pyramidal leverage -0.282*** -0.286***
(0.0904) (0.101)






Observations 872 872 673 673
R-squared 0.145 0.143 0.173 0.174
In this table, we reproduce the estimation of Table 6 Panel B with an alternative measure
of pyramidal leverage; for average leverage and equivalent leverage, instead of assuming
that missing holding entities have the mean leverage, we now conservatively set their
leverage to zero. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for variable definitions.
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correlation between dividends received and interest rate obligations is very high, at
ρ ≥ 0.6 for various variable definitions. This is in contrast to the absence of any
correlation between dividends received and the two other possible dividend uses,
the increase in total assets between year t and year t+1 and the increase in cash.
Multivariate regressions show evidence consistent with this correlation. We
recall that the coefficients for the two pyramidal debt measures are highly
significant and negative in Table 2.6, Panel B, and that this relationship does not
change after the crisis. By contrast, we find no evidence (in untabulated
regressions) that dividends passed through are determined by a holding vehicle’s
value or a change in its total assets. In conclusion, our findings suggest that debt
service considerations are the major determinant of payout decisions in the
pyramid.
2.6.4Double Voting Rights and Share Repurchases
Pyramidal leverage also has an impact on the disproportionality between voting
and cash flow rights. In France, pyramids are the only available control-enhancing
mechanism, besides double voting rights. One final possibility we explore is that
owners might choose pyramidal leverage mostly as a means to magnify their
effective control wedge.
To investigate this possibility, we explicitly analyze double voting rights,
which are a widely used control-enhancing mechanism in France.22 According to
___________________________________________________________
22 Ginglinger and Hamon (2012) report that about two thirds of listed French companies
adopt double voting rights and that they are most popular among smaller and family
companies; our numbers are comparable. Two other control-enhancing devices are in
principle available but rarely used: non-voting shares are used by less than 2% of
blockholder-controlled firms; voting caps are used by only about 1% (Ginglinger and
Hamon, 2012). In 2014, the French law changed and the grant of double voting rights was
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French law, the company’s charter can convey a double voting right to each share
if the share is held for a specified period, which must be between two and four
years. Thus, double voting rights are distinct from dual-class shares as they are a
premium for loyalty that is non-exclusive (every share acquires the right after
satisfying the holding requirement) and is lost when the share is sold. Controlling
owners who adopt double voting rights are those most likely to be driven by
control motives, and the use of pyramidal leverage will magnify the control wedge
most for those owners.
To assess the role played by double voting rights, we trace the actual voting
rights (including double voting rights) of the dominant owner in our 2003 sample
from annual reports and disclosure statements obtained from the AMF, the French
stock market regulator. We find that for operating firms, double voting rights
make no difference to the control rights allocation – either because the dominant
owner already holds more than 50% of the votes, or because the firm remains
widely held after accounting for double voting rights. We calculate a modified
measure for the control wedge taking into account double voting rights, and rerun
our relevant regressions with this modified measure. Our results are unchanged by
this modification (not reported in tables): the control wedge variable remains
insignificant, whereas the variables for pyramidal leverage remain strongly
significant.
We do not explicitly include stock repurchases in our study. Stock
repurchases in France are relatively small in value: David and Ginglinger (2016)
report a ratio of buybacks to dividends of about 1:5 for the 2003-2012 period for
French companies, and report that the ratio is the same for firms that drastically
made the legal default status, leading to a considerably increase of their use, even though
companies could opt out (so-called Florange law, see Becht, Kamisarenka, Pajuste, 2018).
This law change, however, occurred after our sample period.
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cut dividends during the post-crisis period after 2008 and firms that do not. These
proportions make it unlikely that including stock buybacks would alter our results.
Also, David and Ginglinger (2016) find that stock repurchases in the 2003-2007
period are unrelated to firms’ decision whether to drastically cut dividends during
the post-crisis period. In addition, in a preliminary test of the early years of our
sample period (years 2000-2003), we include data on actual stock repurchases and
find that their inclusion does not alter our findings on dividend payouts in this
subsample. For these reasons, we are confident that our main results would not be
altered when adding the value of stock repurchases to our dependent variables.
2.7 Conclusions
We investigate the use of leverage by dominant owners by analyzing the case of
France where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in
holding vehicles, and holding companies are relatively transparent. We suggest
that debt in pyramidal holdings increases the need for dividend payouts such that
the controlling owner can meet the debt service obligations. These predictions are
borne out in our empirical investigation around the 2008/2009 financial crisis. We
find the use of debt in holding companies leads to increased dividend payouts
during the crisis years. We use different metrics to aggregate the leverage of
pyramids and find that in each case the dividend payouts of the listed holding
company are largely determined by the debt service obligations in the holding
companies.
We analyze the actual dividend payouts to dominant owners along the
pyramidal chain. We find that on average, leveraged owners ultimately receive
only about 60% of the dividends made available to them, with the rest being
absorbed in pyramids mainly to service debt. Thus, while many leveraged
blockholders probably have the capacity to service their pyramidal debt by
reducing their dividend income, our results show that they prefer on average to
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pass on at least parts of the required adjustment to the companies they control via
a change in the payout policy.
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Appendix A - Definition of Variables
Dividend / Total assets Cash dividend divided by total assets, with dividend measured in year t+1.
Dividend / Cash flows Cash dividend divided by net income plus depreciation, with dividend
measured at t+1; set to one when cash flows are negative or when the ratio
exceeds one.
Ln(Total assets) Natural logarithm of book of value total assets.
Sales growth Two-year growth rate of sales.
Operational risk Standard deviation of return on assets measured over five years (t-4 to t).
Loss Dummy variable equal one when net income is negative and zero otherwise.
Capex Capital expenditure.
Tobin's Q Market capitalization divided by book value of assets.
Cash flow Net income plus depreciation.
ROA Return on assets.
Direct ownership Proportion of common shares held by the dominant owner (largest owner when
controlling more than 20% of voting rights). See Section 3.2 for details.
Control wedge Discrepancy between voting and cash flow rights. See Section 3.2 for details.
Interest coverage ratio EBIT / Interest expense, similar to Hoshi et al. (1990).
Leverage ratio Total financial debt over total assets.
Net debt / EBITDA Total financial debt minus cash and cash equivalents, as a fraction of EBITDA.
Retained earnings/ Total
equity
Aggregate of (cumulative) retained earnings as a proportion of total equity.
Annual share turnover Annual volume / number of shares outstanding. Annual volume is the
cumulative daily trading volume over the calendar year; number of shares the
number of common shares outstanding at fiscal-year end.
Widely held Dummy variable equal to one if the company has no dominant owner,
controlling more than 20% of voting rights.
Block owned pyramid Dummy variable equal to one if the company has a dominant owner,
controlling more than 20% of voting rights, who controls the company using at
least one holding vehicle.
Block owned no pyramid Dummy variable equal to one if the company has a dominant owner,
controlling more than 20% of voting rights, who does not make use of holding
vehicles.
Investment ratio Part of all assets of a holding company that is constituted by the ultimate
owners’ equity stake in the pyramidal entity directly below, or in the listed
operating company if the listed operating company is placed immediately
below the holding entity (investment ratios are lagged by one period, and
capped within the interval [0, 1]).
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Interest expense Total of interest expenditure by a holding vehicle.
Dividends received Amount of dividends received by the holding entity (in euros).
Dividends received/Total
assets
Dividends received, divided by the total assets of the holding entity.
Div. received / (Interest
expense × Investment
ratio)
Dividends received, divided by Interest expense × Investment ratio.
Div. received / (Interest
expense × Investment ratio
capped between 0 and 1)
Dividends received, divided by Interest expense × Investment ratio. The value
of this ratio is fixed at zero if the calculation yields a negative value, and fixed
at one if the calculation yields a value larger than one.
Pyramidal leverage
(average)
Mean leverage ratio of all observed pyramidal entities in the pyramidal
structure. See Section 3.2 for details.
Pyramidal leverage
(equivalent)
Aggregate leverage exposure of the ultimate owner through all pyramidal
entities including the bottom company in the pyramidal structure. See Section
3.2 for details of its calculation.
Number of layers Longest chain of companies linking the ultimate owner to the operating
company, including the operating company, so the number of holding




Fraction of holding companies for which we do not observe the capital
structure.
dPostCrisis Dummy variable equal to one for the post-crisis year 2009, 2010, 2011.
dNext is Ultimate Owner Dummy variable equal to one if the owner of a holding vehicle controlling
more than 20% of its voting rights is the ultimate dominant owner of the
operating company.
DivPassThrough Fraction of the dividends that the operating company makes available to the
dominant owner that is eventually received by the dominant owner, i.e.
dividends received by the dominant owner / (dominant owner’s combined
ownership in the operating company × dividend paid by operating company).
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Appendix B:  Full algorithms for the equivalent leverage and control wedge
To correctly identify dominant owners and their control and cash flow rights, we
first identify for each company all direct equity stakes in excess of 5%. We then
determine whether the entities owning these blocks of shares are directly or
indirectly owned by other shareholders or entities with stakes in excess of 5%.
This process is iterated until we reach the ultimate owners.23 For the set of N
entities found in this process, including ultimate owners and the operating
company, we denote the equity stake of entity i in entity j by αij. Let A = (αij) be
the NN-matrix of all shareholdings in the pyramid, including those of ultimate
owners. We place the operating company in the last position, so that αiN denotes
entity i’s stake in the operating company. Let ak be the column vector of direct
stockholdings of ultimate shareholder k in the N entities. Then the cash flow rights
fk of ultimate shareholder k in all entities are consistently defined by the vector:24
fk = (I - A)-1 ak ,
where I is the identity matrix. The N-th element of this vector, fkN, denotes
shareholder k’s level of cash flow rights in the operating firm. For example, if the
pyramid consists only of a single control chain of vertically stacked entities (as in
the Section 2.2 example), this algorithm determines fkN simply as the product of all






iikNf  . If the ultimate owner
___________________________________________________________
23 For ultimate owners identified in this procedure, we also record share stakes smaller than
5% that they hold in the operating company or in another entity.
24 This procedure is used and explained e.g. in Almeida et al. (2011) and Chapelle and
Szafarz (2005). It follows the classical example of input-output analysis and can handle any
level of pyramidal complexity.
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is linked to the operating company via multiple but disjointed control chains, the
algorithm will calculate the product of ownership stakes along each control chain
and then add these products to obtain fkN.25 Following Almeida et al. (2011), we
capture the discontinuous character of control rights by introducing a threshold
that indicates the level of control above which the shareholder is said to assume
absolute control; we also fix its value at 50%. Adopting this majority rule, we
convert effective control rights (i.e. the sum of direct and indirect voting rights in a
company) of greater than 50% in any entity into full control of 100%. The other
stakes are then allocated zero control rights. Formally, we redefine the control




















This algorithm must be applied iteratively, by replacing fkj by ckj for all ultimate
owners and repeating the algorithm until the procedure converges to a vector ck,
which in our sample it does in all cases after only a few rounds.26 After the
iterative process converges, ckN, the N-th element in the vector ck, denotes
___________________________________________________________
25 The matrix approach is only needed to properly define ownership rights in more complex
pyramidal structures, such as cross-holdings, and it handles any level of complexity
consistently. For the implementation of the matrix algorithm, we use a consistent and
conventional procedure to resolve possible conflicts and to assign the appropriate stake to the
applicable control chain, by checking whether a particular stake occurs twice and then
stopping tracing.
26 The iteration is only needed if an ultimate owner k has several, direct or indirect, holdings
in an entity j; if their sum fkj exceeds 0.5, the algorithm will convert fkj to ckj = 1, which in turn
may lead the combined holdings of owner k in another entity m to exceed 0.5 and hence
trigger the next round of conversions, etc.
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shareholder k’s level of control rights in the operating firm.27 We define the







We calculate equivalent leverage in complex pyramids as follows. Let li denote
the leverage ratio (1 - equity/total assets) of entity i (li = 0 for ultimate owners).
We define ij = αij ·(1 - li) as the debt-adjusted cash flow right of entity i after
receiving dividends from entity j and paying its debt service. Let B = (ij) be the
NN-matrix of all debt-adjusted cash flow rights in the pyramid, and bk as the
vector of debt-adjusted cash flow rights of shareholder k. Following the same
procedure as for unadjusted cash flow rights, we obtain the vector dk (I - B)-1 bk ,
where the N-th element dkN denotes shareholder k’s level of debt-adjusted cash
flow rights in the operating firm. That is, we decompose fkN introduced above into
two components: fkN - dkN is the part that is consumed by debt service obligations,
and dkN is the part that is left for the ultimate owner. Taking into account that we
need to scale by the aggregate cash flow rights, we define the equivalent leverage
of ultimate owner k as:







27 It is instructive to compare this measure of control rights to the widely used weakest link
rule (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). In a single control chain such as in
the Figure 1 example, the weakest link equates control rights with the smallest equity stake
along the chain, thus implicitly converting the control rights of all other links to 100%
similar to our rule. Since this conversion, however, also applies to equity stakes smaller than
50% but larger than the weakest link, the weakest link rule often leads to assigning larger
control rights to dominant owners than our rule does. The control rights assigned by the
weakest link rule are not always larger in the case of multiple and complex control chains.
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To provide some intuition for this matrix expression, in the case where there are
just two distinct control chains (but there are no crossholdings or loops), this
expression can be written as:
Equivalent pyramidal leveragek =

























































Obviously, in the case of a single control chain (as in the Section 2.2 example),






ii , that cancels out from both
the numerator and denominator, and we are left with the expression given in
Section 2.2.
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Appendix C - Additional results referred to in Chapter 2
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Table IA2.1: Investment regressions
Pyramidal leverage, missing = 0
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Capex Capex
Tobin's Q 0.0706*** 0.0697***
(0.0176) (0.0176)
Cash flow 0.495** 0.491**
(0.201) (0.204)
Dividend / Cash flow -0.101** -0.0990**
(0.0467) (0.0481)
Pyramidal leverage (average) -0.0245
(0.0698)
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) -0.0315
(0.0412)
Pyramidal leverage (average) * dPostCrisis 0.128
(0.0812)
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) * dPostCrisis 0.0343
(0.0585)
Other control variables Y Y
Year and industry FE Y Y
Observations 1,087 1,087
R-squared 16.6% 16.4%
In this table, we test whether there is a significant change in investment expenditures
(capex) after the crisis, as a function of pyramidal leverage. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. See Tables 1 and 2 for variable
definitions.
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Table IA2.2: Alternative dividend variables
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div/Sales Div/Sales Div/Sales Div/CF Div/CF Div/CF
Pyramidal leverage -0.0421*** -0.0425** -0.0411** -0.0333 -0.0224 -0.0231
(0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0394) (0.0416) (0.0415)
Leverage -0.0116 -0.0181 -0.0150 -0.213*** -0.188*** -0.188***
(0.0322) (0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0605) (0.0663) (0.0663)
Ln (assets) 0.00552 0.00446 0.00547 0.0168** 0.0170** 0.0166**
(0.00367) (0.00332) (0.00373) (0.00701) (0.00672) (0.00745)
Cash and equivalents 0.0950 0.0771 0.0851 0.185 0.198 0.197
(0.0612) (0.0646) (0.0632) (0.137) (0.134) (0.134)
dLoss 0.0184* 0.0197* 0.0211* -0.0295 -0.0187 -0.0168
(0.0103) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0401) (0.0439) (0.0447)
Operating risk 0.393** 0.423* 0.438* 0.162 0.423 0.410
(0.196) (0.222) (0.226) (0.388) (0.474) (0.480)
Growth -0.0244 -0.0264 -0.0275 -0.0589* -0.0602* -0.0606*
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0352) (0.0362) (0.0361)
Control wedge 0.00498 0.00515 0.00500 0.00493 0.00484 0.00487
(0.00475) (0.00483) (0.00474) (0.00590) (0.00583) (0.00583)
Tobin's Q 0.00495 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0114 0.00920 0.00873
(0.0132) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0141)
ROA 0.328*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.112 0.0217 0.0263
(0.114) (0.143) (0.143) (0.213) (0.323) (0.324)
Pyramidal leverage × dPostCrisis 0.0409** 0.0394** 0.0416** 0.111* 0.111* 0.107*
(0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0624) (0.0631) (0.0628)
Leverage × dPostCrisis 0.00630 0.00754 0.0112
(0.0398) (0.0437) (0.0432)
Liquidity -0.0193* -0.0158 -0.0136 0.00871
(0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0297) (0.0283)
Retained earnings / Total equity -0.00017 -0.00074 0.0419 0.0436
(0.00848) (0.00838) (0.0303) (0.0305)
Year and industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,151 1,101 1,100 1,126 1,077 1,076
R-squared 0.134 0.142 0.142 0.133 0.141 0.142
This table follows our main regression of Table 2.4, Panel A, but uses alternative measures
for the left-hand side variable: Dividend/Sales (Div/Sales) in columns (1) to (3), and
Dividend/Cash Flow (Div/CF) in columns (4) to (6). Pyramidal leverage used in the
regressions reported in this table is pyramidal leverage (average). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for variable
definitions.
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Table IA2.3: Summary statistics pyramid-owned companies and holding
companies
Panel A: Summary statistics pyramid-owned companies per period, pyramids with complete
info only
    Pre-crisis period (2000-2008)  Post-crisis period (2009-2011)
Mean Median Stdev # obs Mean Median Stdev # obs
Financials
Dividend / Total assets 0.020 0.012 0.040 540 0.014 0.007 0.023 184
Dividend / Cash flows 0.201 0.158 0.224 517 0.186 0.120 0.236 178
Ln(Total assets) 6.464 6.442 2.160 540 6.796 6.899 2.110 184
Leverage ratio 0.229 0.232 0.162 540 0.242 0.224 0.182 184
Sales growth 0.117 0.100 0.302 502 0.000 0.033 0.290 177
Operational risk 0.036 0.022 0.038 540 0.039 0.028 0.041 184
Loss 0.119 - 0.324 540 0.234 - 0.424 184
Capex 0.295 0.269 0.250 473 0.270 0.223 0.240 167
Tobin's Q 1.477 1.205 0.856 539 1.163 1.031 0.406 184
Cash flow 0.083 0.075 0.100 540 0.063 0.055 0.075 184
Direct ownership 0.372 0.326 0.202 540 0.389 0.341 0.220 184
Control wedge 2.215 1.659 2.262 540 2.648 1.769 3.951 184
Pyramidal leverage (average) 0.198 0.136 0.293 539 0.229 0.165 0.271 184
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) 0.435 0.409 0.327 539 0.483 0.489 0.308 184
Number of layers 2.620 2.000 1.608 540 2.728 2.000 1.650 184
Proportion of missing entities - - - 540 - - - 184
Financial constraints, stock market liquidity, firm life cycle
Interest coverage ratio 28.180 5.098 86.716 491 35.522 4.980 113.271 173
Net debt / EBITDA 1.943 1.226 2.704 482 2.456 1.314 3.303 161
Annual share turnover 0.235 0.098 0.361 540 0.314 0.086 0.492 183
Retained earnings / Total equity 0.535 0.622 0.382 519 0.591 0.701 0.403 174
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Panel B: Summary statistics holding companies in pyramids, pyramids with complete
information only
Pre-crisis (2000-2008) Post-crisis (2009-2011)
Mean Median # obs Mean Median # obs
Dividends received / Total assets 0.041 0.013 770 0.033 0.007 281
Interest expense / Total assets 0.012 0.007 770 0.012 0.005 281
Total debt / Total assets 0.190 0.102 770 0.196 0.080 281
LT debt / Total assets 0.164 0.031 770 0.195 0.063 281
Cash / Total assets 0.069 0.012 770 0.059 0.007 281
Investment ratio 1.012 0.651 770 1.136 0.813 281
Investment ratio, capped between 0 and 1 0.597 0.651 770 0.639 0.813 281
Ln(Total assets) 5.641 5.207 770 5.620 5.175 281
dNext is Ultimate Owner 0.626 1.000 770 0.534 1.000 281
Ownership stake 0.565 0.517 770 0.583 0.553 281
In this table, we provide additional summary statistics on pyramidal-owned companies and
of their holding companies for the entire sample period, in addition to the summary
statistics provided in Table 2.5. Panel A and Panel B of this table only include holding
companies for companies with complete observation of the pyramidal variables, in contrast
to Table 2.5, Panel A and Panel B, that includes all companies, including companies with
incomplete observation of the pyramidal entities. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for variable
definitions.
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Table IA2.4: Summary statistics pyramid-owned companies per period,
pyramids with complete information only, with sample split by pyramidal
average leverage
Observations with top quartile pyramidal average leverage
Pre-crisis period (2000-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2011)
Mean Median Stdev # obs Mean Median Stdev # obs
Dividend / Total assets 0.022 0.012 0.058 135 0.021 0.011 0.037 46
Ln (Total assets) 6.921 7.255 2.408 135 6.862 6.759 2.112 46
Leverage ratio 0.256 0.258 0.149 135 0.238 0.230 0.189 46
Sales growth 0.112 0.123 0.326 126 0.058 0.056 0.158 43
Operational risk 0.039 0.022 0.044 135 0.050 0.039 0.043 46
Loss 0.156 - 0.364 135 0.239 - 0.431 46
Capex 0.291 0.281 0.260 114 0.307 0.224 0.270 44
Tobin's Q 1.428 1.271 0.583 135 1.216 1.072 0.425 46
Cash flow 0.056 0.063 0.129 135 0.056 0.055 0.063 46
Dividend / Cash flows 0.205 0.167 0.218 131 0.223 0.183 0.232 46
Direct ownership 0.414 0.396 0.212 135 0.440 0.341 0.251 46
Control wedge 1.678 1.506 0.704 135 1.482 1.159 0.719 46
Pyramidal leverage (average) 0.522 0.470 0.426 135 0.580 0.490 0.310 46
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) 0.727 0.667 0.373 135 0.766 0.738 0.269 46
Number of layers 2.681 2.000 1.268 135 2.609 2.000 0.977 46
Proportion of missing entities - - - 135 - - - 46
Interest coverage ratio 15.821 4.478 42.726 126 25.627 7.372 55.483 45
Net debt / EBITDA 2.166 1.775 2.083 118 2.513 1.143 3.343 39
Annual share turnover 0.352 0.152 0.488 135 0.445 0.078 0.654 46
Retained earnings / Total equity 0.427 0.432 0.397 129 0.579 0.701 0.412 44
Observations with bottom three quartiles pyramidal average leverage
Pre-crisis period (2000-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2011)
Mean Median Stdev # obs Mean Median Stdev # obs
Dividend / Total assets 0.019 0.012 0.033 404 0.011 0.007 0.014 138
Ln (Total assets) 6.321 6.206 2.045 404 6.774 6.919 2.117 138
Leverage ratio 0.220 0.218 0.166 404 0.244 0.220 0.180 138
Sales growth 0.120 0.096 0.294 375 -0.018 0.028 0.319 134
Operational risk 0.034 0.021 0.036 404 0.035 0.022 0.040 138
Loss 0.104 - 0.306 404 0.232 - 0.424 138
Capex 0.296 0.267 0.248 359 0.257 0.213 0.228 123
Tobin's Q 1.493 1.182 0.930 403 1.146 1.011 0.399 138
Cash flow 0.093 0.080 0.084 404 0.065 0.055 0.079 138
Dividend / Cash flows 0.200 0.154 0.226 385 0.173 0.097 0.236 132
Direct ownership 0.359 0.310 0.197 404 0.372 0.342 0.207 138
Control wedge 2.396 1.722 2.559 404 3.036 1.827 4.481 138
Pyramidal leverage (average) 0.090 0.069 0.088 404 0.111 0.096 0.105 138
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) 0.337 0.325 0.241 404 0.389 0.362 0.258 138
Number of layers 2.601 2.000 1.709 404 2.768 2.000 1.822 138
Proportion of missing entities - - - 404 - - - 138
Interest coverage ratio 32.586 5.787 97.178 364 39.000 4.604 127.527 128
Net debt / EBITDA 1.871 0.963 2.876 364 2.437 1.362 3.304 122
Annual share turnover 0.195 0.087 0.299 404 0.270 0.087 0.418 137
Retained earnings / Total equity 0.570 0.665 0.370 390 0.596 0.699 0.402 130
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Table IA2.4 (continued): Summary statistics pyramid-owned companies per
period, pyramids with complete information only, with sample split by
pyramidal equivalent leverage
Observations with top quartile pyramidal equivalent leverage
Pre-crisis period (2000-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2011)
Mean Median Stdev # obs Mean Median Stdev # obs
Dividend / Total assets 0.018 0.010 0.044 135 0.009 0.003 0.013 46
Ln (Total assets) 7.590 7.755 2.295 135 7.152 6.853 2.130 46
Leverage ratio 0.287 0.306 0.160 135 0.329 0.342 0.219 46
Sales growth 0.080 0.091 0.310 127 -0.053 0.009 0.326 41
Operational risk 0.036 0.019 0.041 135 0.045 0.036 0.046 46
Loss 0.141 - 0.349 135 0.326 - 0.474 46
Capex 0.275 0.264 0.245 114 0.247 0.213 0.228 41
Tobin's Q 1.344 1.198 0.502 135 1.107 0.994 0.294 46
Cash flow 0.039 0.051 0.117 135 0.032 0.031 0.058 46
Dividend / Cash flows 0.234 0.165 0.282 124 0.137 0.047 0.182 45
Direct ownership 0.299 0.259 0.181 135 0.359 0.323 0.243 46
Control wedge 3.644 2.000 3.971 135 4.385 1.687 6.677 46
Pyramidal leverage (average) 0.431 0.342 0.459 135 0.440 0.366 0.384 46
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) 0.829 0.771 0.337 135 0.861 0.810 0.209 46
Number of layers 3.874 3.000 1.945 135 4.043 3.000 2.573 46
Proportion of missing entities - - - 135 - - - 46
Interest coverage ratio 9.618 3.350 34.404 116 8.329 2.821 19.408 43
Net debt / EBITDA 2.868 2.292 3.277 115 3.509 2.734 3.739 38
Annual share turnover 0.379 0.188 0.517 135 0.267 0.030 0.417 46
Retained earnings / Total equity 0.382 0.365 0.440 131 0.482 0.640 0.461 45
Observations with bottom three quartiles pyramidal equivalent leverage
Pre-crisis period (2000-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2011)
Mean Median Stdev # obs Mean Median Stdev # obs
Dividend / Total assets 0.021 0.012 0.039 404 0.016 0.010 0.025 138
Ln (Total assets) 6.098 5.973 1.972 404 6.677 6.899 2.097 138
Leverage ratio 0.210 0.210 0.158 404 0.213 0.193 0.159 138
Sales growth 0.131 0.115 0.298 374 0.016 0.051 0.277 136
Operational risk 0.035 0.022 0.037 404 0.036 0.024 0.039 138
Loss 0.109 0.000 0.312 404 0.203 0.000 0.404 138
Capex 0.301 0.272 0.252 359 0.277 0.239 0.244 126
Tobin's Q 1.521 1.209 0.942 403 1.182 1.037 0.436 138
Cash flow 0.098 0.087 0.087 404 0.073 0.067 0.077 138
Dividend / Cash flows 0.191 0.155 0.201 392 0.202 0.143 0.250 133
Direct ownership 0.397 0.335 0.203 404 0.399 0.367 0.212 138
Control wedge 1.739 1.582 0.829 404 2.068 1.769 2.204 138
Pyramidal leverage (average) 0.121 0.069 0.143 404 0.158 0.108 0.172 138
Pyramidal leverage (equivalent) 0.303 0.324 0.189 404 0.357 0.362 0.220 138
Number of layers 2.203 2.000 1.224 404 2.290 2.000 0.830 138
Proportion of missing entities 0.000 0.000 0.000 404 0.000 0.000 0.000 138
Interest coverage ratio 34.062 6.537 96.777 374 44.516 5.380 129.060 130
Net debt / EBITDA 1.653 0.752 2.432 367 2.130 1.004 3.101 123
Annual share turnover 0.186 0.091 0.277 404 0.330 0.107 0.515 137
Retained earnings / Total equity 0.586 0.666 0.345 388 0.629 0.749 0.376 129
Note: This table replicates the analysis of Table 2.5 Panel B, but uses a different breakdown of
companies, by distinguishing between the top quartile of firms by pyramidal average or equivalent
leverage, and all other firms. This table considers only pyramid-owned companies with complete
financial information for all pyramidal entities. In this table, pyramidal leverage variables assume
missing ratios = average ratios. See Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 for variables definitions.
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Chapter 3: Do firms anticipate security issues by conservative reporting?
____________________________________________________________
[Chapter 3 is temporarily under embargo]




International comparison of accounting conservatism:
drivers of conservative reporting and variations across the
world 32
4.1 Introduction
Conservatism refers to the more timely recognition of losses in reported financial
statements compared to gains. This accounting principle is a long-standing concept
but its explanations have gained interest in the research community relatively
recently. Empirically, conservatism has been shown to have persisted over a long
period of time and has in fact been increasing in the past decades (Basu, 1997;
Watts, 2003b). In an overview provided by Watts (2003a, 2003b), four main
causes of conservatism have so far been put forth, the most prominent of which is
the contracting view. The basic tenet is that conservative accounting practice
reduces the agency costs inherent in the institutional structure of public
corporations and therefore benefits both debt and equity holders. For debt holders,
___________________________________________________________
32   This is a single-authored chapter.
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timely recognition of losses leads to a timely transfer of control over the firm to
them in time of distress, facilitating monitoring and preventing shareholders (who
could be seen as holders of call option on the company) from taking excessive risk
or overpaying dividends in the process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts,
1993, 2003a; Ball, 2001). For equity holders, conservatism responds to the
shareholder demand and serves to mitigate the agency cost related to managers’
tendency to overstate current performance as reported on the financial statements
(for instance, by delaying disclosure of bad news), which directly and indirectly
affect their welfare and compensation (LaFond and Watts, 2008).
In this chapter, I investigate how the issuance of debt and equity affects
the demand for conservative accounting in different countries (firm-level) as well
as how certain institutional and market factors can explain variations in
conservatism across the world (country-level). The contribution to the existing
literature (including the previous chapter of this dissertation) is two-fold. First, I
offer further insights into the relationship between capital markets and financial
reporting practices at firm level. The findings of this study would be an interesting
addition to the existing body of conservatism research due to the presence of
conflicting evidence. Ball et al. (2008) analyze data from 22 countries and show
that – on an aggregate country-level – conditional conservatism is influenced
primarily by demand from debt markets and not equity markets. The debtholder
demand view is also consistent with other works that have shown conservative
reporting to be associated with more favorable terms for borrowers (Zhang, 2008),
lower cost of debt (Ahmed et al., 2002) and longer maturity (Kang et al., 2017).
On the other hand, an argument for equity markets demand has been made as well
based on the observation of Bushman and Piotroski (2006) that the quality of
judicial system and shareholder protection increase conditional conservatism in
their analysis of public companies in 38 countries. Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
also find that, in the United Kingdom, public firms report more conservatively
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than private firms although they are subject to the same regulatory provisions.
They conclude that the difference in reporting quality can be attributed to the
market demand. Similar results based on US data are obtained in Givoly et al.
(2010) where listed companies are found to recognize losses more timely than
gains to a greater degree than private firms. In another study of UK companies by
Ball and Shivakumar (2008), firms’ accounting reports exhibit higher timeliness
around the time of initial public offerings (IPO) compared to the period during
which they were private. The reason for this is that higher reporting quality is
required to resolve the information asymmetry between investors and issuing
firms, pointing again to the equity markets demand. Furthermore, conservatism
has also been shown to lead to lower cost of equity (Li, 2015; Garcia Lara et al.,
2011) with weaker effects for firms with lower information asymmetry (Artiach
and Clarkson, 2013). Furthermore, it has been shown in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation that, based on the US data over the period 1988 – 2013, firms that
raise equity exhibit greater timeliness of loss recognition than non-issuers,
especially in the period leading up to the deal and in the public markets. Deal
effects on conservative reporting are, however, not detected for debt transactions
or for equity private placements.
In the first stage of this research, I analyze the reporting behavior of
companies in 45 countries during the period 1987 – 2015 to understand the impact
of fundraising events on accounting conservatism. The long timespan of the data
has two advantages. One is that it allows for a study of the timing of conservatism
– i.e. whether it serves a signaling purpose towards capital providers prior to the
deal or it follows such capital structure decisions. The other benefit is that it makes
it possible to investigate how the demand for conservatism develops through time,
specifically around the global financial crisis in the late 2000s. This is especially
relevant considering that both debtholder and shareholder demand for
conservatism is driven by its contracting benefits, which could play a significant
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role in investors’ capital allocation process in the period where capital markets and
the banking systems were affected by the credit crunch. These factors might have
influenced accounting practices of firms facing liquidity constraints. Indeed, there
is evidence that conservatism could facilitate easier access to external funding.
Balakrishnan et al. (2016) find that companies that report more conservatively see
a smaller decline in investments than less conservative counterparts during the
financial crisis, as their ability to raise funding reduces their need to limit
spending. Moreover, in relation to the equity markets, Francis et al. (2013) observe
a significantly positive relationship between conservatism and firm value during
the crisis, especially for companies with weaker governance or higher information
asymmetry, i.e. in cases where the shareholder demand for measures against
agency costs is strongest.
The second contribution to the literature is to provide additional evidence
for conservatism in an international setting. Despite the greater understanding of
the determinants of financial reporting timeliness, the majority of the conservatism
research has been conducted based on the US data. The amount of international
studies is increasing but still limited, making an analysis of cross-country variation
in the demand for conservatism a relevant topic. Based on the existing literature,
country-level legal and institutional arrangements (which are built upon the
seminal work by La Porta et al., 1997 and La Porta et al., 1998) have been shown
to affect the extent to which accounting figures are reported conservatively. Ball et
al. (2000) find that, in their sample of seven countries, earnings in common-law
countries are more conservative due to the greater reliance on financial statements
in setting contract clauses, as the closer relations between managers and
contracting parties in code-law countries reduces the information asymmetry
between the two and hence the demand for conservatism. Moreover, the
researchers provide evidence that, among common-law countries, conservatism
also increases with accounting regulation as well as the expected costs to
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accounting firms related to investor litigation. Similar results are also obtained for
four East Asian countries in a paper by Ball et al. (2003), in which financial
reporting practice is shown to be affected not only by the institutional framework
but also economic and political factors in those countries. Elsewhere, UK
companies that are cross-listed in the US have been shown to report more
conservatism earnings than their counterparts without such cross-listing because of
a stricter enforcement regime within which the former group operates (Huijgen
and Lubberink, 2005). Peek et al. (2010) compare the asymmetrical timeliness
between private and public companies across 13 European countries and argue that
both the creditors and investors in public entities have a greater demand for
accounting information than their counterparts in private firms due to its
contracting and governance role. By relating the demand for conservatism to the
degree of creditor and investor protection provided by a country’s institutions,
they find that the public versus private firm difference in timeliness is attributed to
the demand of the creditors – and not the shareholders – of public firms. In a more
recent study, Li (2015) examines conservatism in a sample of 35 countries over an
18-year period and concludes that the level of conservatism of a country’s
financial reporting system could reduce its firms’ cost of debt and equity.
While this paper shares similarities with Ball et al. (2008) in terms of the
focus on debtholder and shareholder views on conservatism as well as the general
setup of the study, there are also important differences. First, I investigate the
relationship between conservatism and capital structure at firm level (by
examining the effect of debt and equity issues on reporting) as well as analyze
how country-level conservatism correlates with the size of debt and equity markets
controlling for legal and institutional factors. Ball et al., in contrast, only cover the
latter relationship in their study. The next key difference is the selection of the
accounting conservatism measure. Specifically, I employ the Ball and Shivakumar
(2005) model, where economic gains and losses are captured by operating cash
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flow terms rather than stock returns. The reason for this is that security issues have
been shown to be closely connected with stock prices in the period around the
deals (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Spies and Affleck-
Graves, 1995, 1999). Thus, using a returns-based model would confound
conservatism effects with market price movements due to issues in the setup of
this paper (whereas this would not pose an issue in the Ball et al. (2008) model as
they only observe debt and equity effects at a macro level). Finally, it is important
to note as well that the dataset in this research is more extensive as it covers a
longer time period and contains more companies as well as countries.
Using an extensive dataset consisting of more than 540,000 firm-year
observations in 45 countries over the period 1987 – 2015, I find a remarkable
variation in the levels of conditional conservatism by firms across the world.
Temporal effects are also observed, as companies reporting behavior (referring
specifically to the asymmetrical timeliness of loss recognition) changes over time,
especially around the financial crisis. Some of the key results here are in sharp
contrast to earlier studies, especially Ball et al. (2008). For one, the empirical
evidence in this research provides much stronger support for the shareholders’
demand view compared to the debt market demand. Furthermore, conservatism is
associated not only with the legal origin of the counties but also their institutional
factors (in terms of protection of creditor rights as well as investor rights).
4.2 Data and methodology
4.2.1  Data
The analysis is based on three categories of data – financial information, deals as
well as markets and institutional variables. The former two are on a firm level
while the latter is on a country level. For accounting variables, data are retrieved
from WRDS / Compustat Global, which is consistent with the papers most closely
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related to my research, e.g. Ball and Shivakumar (2006), Ball et al. (2008),
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and Li (2015). The sample covers all listed, non-
financial, both active and non-active, firms in the database during the fiscal year
period 1987 to 2015. Firm-year observations are only acknowledged in the period
that a firm is public and only if the accounting data are complete. Debt and equity
issue data are collected from Thomson One Banker / SDC for the same time
period (except for the United States where the deals data are from the period 1988
to 2013). Deals identified as “withdrawn”, “shelf” and “registration” as well as
duplicate entries are then removed from the total sample (e.g. if a debt issue is
offered in two markets on the same day, this would be shown as two separate
records in the raw data but we would only keep the most recent one for the
analysis). Moreover, in case there are multiple debt or multiple equity issues by
the same firm in a fiscal year, only information on the most recent deal is
recorded. Convertible instruments are not considered in the analysis due to their
mixed equity and debt characteristics; nevertheless, it should be noted that there is
only a relatively limited number of convertible deals in the sample, especially per
country, so the impact of their exclusion is minimal. Finally, with regards to equity
issues, I did not include Initial Public Offerings in the analysis due to the potential
accounting- and disclosure-related issues that are associated with in the decision to
go public, which may influence the results.
The data in the financial and deals databases are joined in the first instance
based on SEDOL, CUSIP and company names. For the remaining observations,
matches are manually made by considering partial and ‘fuzzy’ company name
links. Following this approach, I am able to cover approximately 74% and 61% of
the debt and equity deals, respectively, in the dataset (i.e. the issuers in Thomson
One Banker could be linked with the firms in Compustat Global). Indicator
variables are then created to identify whether a firm issued debt or equity in each
period of a five-year time window relative to the financial data. As an example, for
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a firm-year observation with financial data in 2000, a debt deal dummy variable in
period t-2 would be 1 if the firm issued a bond in 1998 and an equity deal dummy
variable in period t+1 would be 1 if additional equity was raised in 2001.
Moreover, dummy variables are also used to distinguish between public and
private issues for both deal types.
The raw Thomson One Banker dataset contains deals information from a
total of 125 countries. To ensure sufficient observations and variation within data,
I filter out countries with less than 50 unique issuers with available financials
during the aforementioned time period. This results in a final sample for the equity
deals analysis with 45 countries and 541,635 firm-year entries, while a final
sample for the debt deals analysis includes 32 countries and 508,153 firm-year
entries. Finally, for the firm-level regression analyses, I removed the outliers, by
way of winsorizing (from both top and bottom end) and manually selecting ranges
based on scatter plots, for each of the accounting variables that have no bounded
minimum and maximum values in the merged dataset.
For the second part of the analysis, markets and institutional variables are
specified to assess various determinants of conservatism at a country level. These
reflect characteristics of the countries in scope with respect to their legal origin,
market development and level of protection of investor rights. The data are
sourced primarily from the various data files underlying the studies of La Porta et
al. (1997, 1998, 2008)33 and from the Financial Structure Database of the World
Bank34. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the 45 countries in the sample
as well as provides the definitions of the variables.
___________________________________________________________
33 These are published on the webpage of Andrei Shleifer
(https://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications)
34 https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/financial-structure-database
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4.2.2  Firm level regression models
Basu’s (1997) piece-wise linear regression, which determines how
contemporaneously sensitive the reported earnings are to bad news relative to
good news (as proxied by stock returns), is by far the most commonly used model
in conservatism research. For this paper, however, I base my analysis primarily on
a different asymmetrical timeliness model following Ball and Shivakumar (2005,
2006) for the following reasons. The first, as previously mentioned, is that debt
and equity deals influence the share prices of the issuers, both pre- and post-
transactions, and therefore it would be difficult and/or cumbersome to separate the
effects of conservatism from those of fundraising activities using a returns-based
model such as Basu (1997). Furthermore, as Monahan (2008) pointed out in his
discussion on the Ball et al. (2008) paper, applying the Basu regression in a cross-
country setting implies that the extent to which returns reflect the news occurring
during the year is the same for the different countries. This seems unlikely to be
the case and could lead to measurement errors in the regression analysis. As good
and bad news are assumed to be reflected in positive operating cash flows and
negative operating cash flows, respectively, in the Ball and Shivakumar model, it
circumvents the need for the returns-based assumptions. Please refer to section
3.3.1 in the Chapter 3 for the descriptions, explanations and interpretations of the
Ball and Shivakumar accruals-based model for accounting conservatism. The main
difference with respect to the execution of the regression analysis here is that the
model in equation (1) is run for each country in the sample separately in order to
obtain country-level estimates.
A key objective of this study is to analyze the influence of capital markets
demand on conservatism. This is done by estimating separate interaction
regression models for debt and equity issues and comparing the timeliness of
reported earnings of firms that raise financing within a specific time window
surrounding a reporting year with firms that do not. Further details can be found in
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Chapter 3 where the regression model is expressed in equation (2). The final
analysis at the company level is to investigate whether the reporting behavior of
firms in each country is affected by the financial crisis as well as the temporal
effects of equity and debt issues on conservatism. To do this, I follow the same
approach as described in Chapter 3 for each of the countries in the sample.
4.2.3 Country level regression models
While the focus of the first stage of this research is on understanding how
capital structure decisions affect firms’ reporting behavior and the drivers behind
such relationship, the second stage is concerned with the indirect effects that the
different countries’ institutional frameworks may have on accounting
conservatism. The approach follows Ball et al. (2008), where the relevant
coefficients reflecting the aggregate conservatism measures of the firms in a
country – i.e. α5 and α11 in model (2) above, which respectively indicate
asymmetrical timeliness and incremental timeliness of loss recognition of issuers –
are regressed on macro-level variables that capture various institutional
characteristics of the country. It is appropriate to treat a financial reporting
property in this way given that firms in a given country are subject to the same
accounting, regulatory and litigation regime. Furthermore, an additional advantage
of a country-level setup is that the results of the analysis are not skewed towards
countries with more companies (e.g. firms based in the United States make up
almost 30% of the total sample, whereas several other countries contribute less
than 1% each). Considering the law and order environment in which firms operate
is important because it determines how effective conditional conservatism could
serve as a governance and contracting mechanism (Li, 2015). From the
debtholders’ perspective, for instance, it would not matter much to trigger a
default if creditor rights are not well protected or carry less priority over other
parties. Likewise, if legal enforcement is weak or it is costly for shareholders to
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take action against managers, the role of timeliness in loss recognition in
mitigating the agency problems would arguably be rather limited. With regards to
financial reporting, there is also evidence that the positive effects of better
accounting standards on the quality financial reporting and capital markets are
present only in countries with effective legal environments and strong enforcement
(Leuz et al., 2003; Daske et al., 2008; Holthausen, 2009; Christensen et al., 2013;
Wang and Yu, 2015).
In studying the factors that could explain the variation in conservatism
across the world, I consider three categories of variables relating to the legal,
institutional and market aspects of the different countries. The relevance and
significance of these variables on financial markets have been well established in
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). In terms of legal origins, common law countries
provide the greatest protection to shareholders and creditors, followed by German
civil law, Scandinavian civil law and finally French civil law countries. Evidence
for relationships between financial reporting and legal traditions can also be found
in Bushman and Petrioski (2006) as well as Ball et al. (2000 and 2003), where it is
shown that conservatism is observed more in common law countries.
With regards to institutional factors, the model includes creditor rights
(Creditor), private and public enforcement indices (PriEnforce and PubEnforce),
assessment of risk of expropriation by the government (RiskExp), assessment of
the country’s rule of law (RuleLaw) and assessment of corruption in government
(Corruption). The variable Creditor measures the extent to which the rights of
creditors (specifically, senior secured lenders) are protected by the bankruptcy and
reorganization laws in default (or defaulting) situations. Based on La Porta et al.
(2006), the private enforcement index captures the strength of the disclosure
requirements, to which prospectuses prepared by securities issuers are subject, and
the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the firms’ directors, distributors
and accountants. The public enforcement index takes into account certain
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characteristics (specifically, independence, appointment, tenure and focus) of the
official authority in charge of supervising the securities markets, the supervisor’s
investigative powers, as well as the applicability of criminal and noncriminal
sanctions for violations of securities laws. The last three variables – RiskExp,
RuleLaw and Corruption – are proxies for the strength of the legal enforcement
system in the countries as assessed by private credit risk agencies for foreign
investors interested in doing business in the respective markets (La Porta et al.,
1998)35,36.
It is not clear how these institutional measures would impact accounting
conservatism. One could argue, on the one hand, that weak institutions would be
associated with a lower financial reporting quality due to lax regulation, lenient
enforcement and interference by governmental or outside forces. Scoring low on
creditor rights protection, risk of expropriation, corruption perception and rule of
law assessment is also an indication that the capital markets would likely be less
developed in terms of size and breadth of investors. Conversely, it could also be
the case that the demand for asymmetrical timeliness would be stronger as a
substitution for the lack of protection for shareholder as well as creditor rights. In
their study of 22 countries over the period 1992 – 2003, Ball et al. (2008) do not
___________________________________________________________
35 These three measures of the quality of institutions are highly correlated (the pair-wise
correlations between them are greater than 0.8). They are therefore separately included
in the regression models. The results are robust with the use of any of these variables.
36 Moreover, it should be noted that the assessments of risk of expropriation, rule of law
and corruption are rather dated, as they represent average monthly index scores of the
respective measures between 1982 and 1995 as published in the International Country
Risk guide. It could be argued, however, that these country characteristics are not likely
to significantly change over time.
Chapter 4: International comparison of accounting conservatism
____________________________________________________________
143
find any significant relationship between (the Basu measure of) conservatism and
institutional factors.
Four country variables that relate to the development of the markets are
included in this analysis. The first is the growth in GDP per capita over the period
1979 to 2003, which is included based on the finding that this measure of national
wealth is positively correlated with more developed stock markets (La Porta et al.,
2006). To take into account the size of the capital markets in each country, I use
the average ratio of the stock market capitalization to GDP (for equity) as well as
the average ratio of the total domestic bond market capitalization (i.e. sum of
public and private issues) to GDP (for debt), for the period 1999 to 200337. The
breadth of the stock market is captured by the average ratio of the number of
domestic firms listed in a given country to its population over the same five-year
period. I would predict that conservatism should have a complementary effect on
the level of market developments. A developed debt market should be associated
with greater reporting quality to cater to the strong demand from debtholders for
asymmetrical timeliness, which facilitates an efficient transfer of control from
insiders to creditors following economic losses. Similarly, conservatism should
arguably be more prevalent in economies with more advanced equity markets, as
investors would expect it as a governance mechanism that limits managers’ ability
to manipulate financial performance at the expense of the shareholders.
The country-level regression model is written as:
___________________________________________________________
37 Since the country-level analysis is not based on panel data, using country variables that
capture average characteristics of the period 1999 to 2003 should be appropriate because
this five-year block is right in the middle of the timeline of the sample of this paper.
Nevertheless, running the regressions with average market sizes as per 2011 (latest
available data at the time of this writing) would not lead to the similar outcomes.
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𝛼𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑑𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑘 +
𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠_𝑃𝑜𝑝)𝑘 +
𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑘 +
𝛽10𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑘 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘 (7)
where αjk denotes the coefficient j for country k from equation (2); dBritish,
dFrench and dScandinavia are dummy variables indicating the legal origins of the
countries in the sample (with the German legal tradition serving as the basis);
GDPCapGr is the growth in GDP per capita as of 2003; MktCap_GDP is the five-
year average ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as of 2003;
Ln(Firms_Pop) is the natural log of the five-year average ratio of the number of
listed firms in a country to its population as of 2003; Bond_GDP is the five-year
average ratio of bond market capitalization to GDP as of 2003; Creditor refers to
the creditor rights index aggregate score per 2003; PriEnforce denotes the private
enforcement index; PubEnforce is the public enforcement index; and
LegalEnforcement represents one of the three variables (RiskExp, RuleLaw and
Corruption) that are proxies for the strength of the law and order tradition in the
country. It is important to note that, since the objective of this second-stage
analysis is to examine the impact of country factors on the two specific aggregate
conservatism measures – i.e. the asymmetrical timeliness of loss recognition and
the incremental effect of debt and equity issue – the dependent variables of interest
in model (7) above are α5 and α11, respectively, of the countries from the first-stage
regressions. As the pre- and post-deal effects are estimated in the different models
in the firm-level analysis, I am also able to assess to what extent the country
variables can explain for the timing of conservatism.
Furthermore, to account for the bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity
in the estimations of the firm-level interaction coefficients, I use a weighted least
square (WLS) model where the conservatism measures are scaled by their absolute
standard errors. The WLS approach also enhances the efficiency of the model, as
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countries with smaller errors (i.e. contain more information) would get larger
weights than those with larger measurement errors; this is especially relevant
given that the dependent variables here are coefficients estimates from different
countries with different underlying sample sizes.
4.3 Results
4.3.1  Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the firms in the sample are shown in Table 1, which is
further divided into three subsections. Table 4.1A presents the company level
variables organized by country and by legal origin. Table 4.1B then exhibits the
same variables in a similar setup but with a breakdown per sub-period. The first
sub-period covers the years 1987 to 1997; the second covers 1998 to 2006; the
third represents the financial crisis period 2007 to 2009; and the last sub-period
relates to the post-crisis years in the data set, i.e. 2010 to 2015. It should be noted
that the statistics shown are the median for all numeric variables and the mean for
indicator variables. Finally, Table 4.1C summarizes the means and medians for the
regression variables separately for debt-issuing and equity-issuing firms.
From Table 4.1A, it is evident that the US is by far the largest country in
terms of the number of public companies in the sample, followed by Japan and
China; the least represented countries, on the other hand, are Colombia,
Luxembourg and Portugal. The majority of the countries (20 out of 45) have
French legal origins. The rest consist of 13 English common law countries, 8
nations in the German legal family and four Scandinavian legal origin countries.
Looking at the financial variables, the accruals are consistently negative across the
sample; this is to be expected considering the difference due to depreciation as
well as the income smoothing role of accruals. Firms in the sample exhibit growth
in revenues across the board, ranging from 0.5% for Australia (median of all
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Table 4.1C: Descriptive statistics per country of firms raising financing in year t0
Median Median Median Median Median Mean Count
Country Issue type Accruals Δ Sales PPE CFO Ln (TAt-1) dNegCFO # obs
English legal origin countries
Australia Equity -0.068 0.000 0.540 -0.102 2.514 0.749 7,353
Debt -0.042 0.048 0.627 0.085 8.200 0.064 251
United Kingdom Equity -0.063 0.049 0.308 0.012 3.603 0.466 4,374
Debt -0.064 0.052 0.691 0.114 7.819 0.031 768
Hong Kong Equity -0.024 0.038 0.503 0.026 8.259 0.329 298
Debt -0.006 0.040 0.672 0.038 11.146 0.082 49
India Equity -0.015 0.108 0.648 0.045 8.653 0.307 1,615
Debt -0.028 0.091 0.733 0.069 10.375 0.229 401
Ireland Equity -0.048 0.008 0.454 0.018 4.458 0.408 206
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Israel Equity -0.054 0.034 0.234 -0.043 4.194 0.543 173
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Sri Lanka Equity 0.029 0.108 0.818 0.017 7.728 0.464 56
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malaysia Equity -0.009 0.048 0.598 0.021 5.559 0.362 1,021
Debt -0.009 0.032 0.624 0.047 7.713 0.194 217
New Zealand Equity -0.044 0.028 0.406 0.030 4.127 0.442 233
Debt -0.037 0.013 0.901 0.074 8.157 0.000 48
Singapore Equity -0.017 0.052 0.479 0.027 4.934 0.383 1,132
Debt -0.005 0.041 0.576 0.043 7.235 0.235 217
Thailand Equity -0.035 0.052 0.790 0.060 8.890 0.294 669
Debt -0.044 0.053 0.852 0.091 10.490 0.117 282
United States Equity -0.049 0.102 0.405 0.056 5.346 0.346 8,326
Debt -0.050 0.055 0.678 0.091 7.873 0.071 7,776
South Africa Equity -0.056 0.091 0.510 0.074 8.454 0.263 171
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
French legal origin countries
Argentina Equity -0.072 0.062 0.935 0.100 7.243 0.122 90
Debt -0.072 0.069 0.942 0.110 7.796 0.045 66
Belgium Equity -0.038 0.047 0.673 0.067 7.367 0.199 186
Debt -0.050 0.025 0.884 0.096 9.037 0.012 81
Brazil Equity -0.038 0.080 0.605 0.062 8.243 0.166 667
Debt -0.043 0.080 0.677 0.067 8.360 0.108 473
Chile Equity -0.029 0.062 0.878 0.062 12.339 0.132 265
Debt -0.041 0.057 0.940 0.078 13.234 0.060 134
Colombia Equity -0.038 0.045 0.737 0.059 15.250 0.188 48
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Egypt Equity 0.011 0.035 0.447 0.005 6.457 0.184 76
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Spain Equity -0.021 0.032 0.740 0.016 8.810 0.098 327
Debt 0.000 0.019 0.991 0.006 10.051 0.013 78
France Equity -0.040 0.041 0.333 0.053 7.821 0.213 1,298
Debt -0.041 0.025 0.505 0.074 10.123 0.021 578
Greece Equity -0.043 0.036 0.687 0.025 6.323 0.275 80
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Indonesia Equity -0.034 0.130 0.876 0.088 14.771 0.161 317
Debt -0.046 0.114 0.792 0.096 14.922 0.097 124
Italy Equity -0.043 0.040 0.454 0.060 8.393 0.205 376
Debt -0.044 0.029 0.641 0.074 9.606 0.068 162
Luxembourg Equity -0.051 0.031 0.672 0.062 7.243 0.229 70
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Median Median Median Median Median Mean Count
Country Issue type Accruals Δ Sales PPE CFO Ln (TAt-1) dNegCFO # obs
Mexico Equity -0.048 0.071 0.827 0.090 10.022 0.095 296
Debt -0.049 0.072 0.837 0.090 10.153 0.058 241
Netherlands Equity -0.046 0.076 0.493 0.090 7.608 0.166 379
Debt -0.052 0.048 0.688 0.110 9.217 0.035 142
Peru Equity -0.043 0.038 1.063 0.109 7.438 0.093 108
Debt -0.043 0.032 1.139 0.114 7.646 0.048 83
Philippines Equity -0.030 0.051 0.695 0.066 9.582 0.250 248
Debt -0.053 0.051 0.687 0.098 11.756 0.060 100
Portugal Equity -0.059 0.029 0.875 0.080 9.012 0.120 100
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Russia Equity -0.051 0.076 0.938 0.099 10.447 0.146 246
Debt -0.054 0.049 0.964 0.112 11.090 0.052 154
Turkey Equity -0.027 0.072 0.558 0.000 6.194 0.333 147
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Vietnam Equity 0.044 0.162 0.488 0.018 13.530 0.396 260
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
German legal origin countries
Austria Equity -0.048 0.063 0.890 0.072 7.952 0.130 131
Debt -0.054 0.044 0.918 0.082 8.922 0.016 62
Switzerland Equity -0.045 0.030 0.586 0.075 7.526 0.146 378
Debt -0.046 0.024 0.692 0.086 8.040 0.009 214
China Equity -0.010 0.077 0.557 0.051 8.451 0.219 2,603
Debt -0.024 0.036 0.573 0.052 9.403 0.184 1,004
Germany Equity -0.040 0.078 0.493 0.045 6.390 0.255 1,018
Debt -0.047 0.040 0.727 0.078 9.609 0.083 314
Japan Equity -0.015 0.037 0.678 0.023 11.899 0.104 5,393
Debt -0.004 0.026 0.781 0.000 13.017 0.031 3,276
South Korea Equity -0.041 0.052 0.573 0.033 13.771 0.331 2,600
Debt -0.036 0.063 0.652 0.048 14.712 0.222 1,693
Poland Equity -0.015 0.075 0.392 0.027 4.883 0.411 253
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Taiwan Equity -0.039 0.049 0.593 0.049 8.315 0.316 1,398
Debt -0.043 0.065 0.808 0.085 11.509 0.091 241
Scandinavian legal origin countries
Denmark Equity -0.054 0.063 0.434 0.020 7.155 0.364 198
Debt n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Finland Equity -0.039 0.054 0.558 0.072 7.627 0.133 270
Debt -0.031 0.048 0.786 0.071 8.788 0.030 132
Norway Equity -0.066 0.048 0.503 0.022 6.906 0.395 438
Debt -0.061 0.044 1.012 0.085 10.186 0.104 77
Sweden Equity -0.049 0.033 0.196 -0.042 5.533 0.563 1,033
Debt -0.036 0.057 0.581 0.083 10.515 0.064 172
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observations in the country) to 11.8% for Vietnam38. The median ratios of gross
property, plant and equipment to total assets for a majority of the countries range
from 40% to 80%. A vast majority of the median cash flows scaled by total assets
are in the 3.0% to 8.0% range. Between 15% and 25% of the total firm-year
observations in most countries have negative cash flow, with Spain being the
lowest (average of 8.3%) and Australia the highest (57.8%). The mean values of
the variables dDebt and dEequity indicate the proportions of observations that
raise funds. With regards to the 32 countries in the debt sample, South Korea has
the most instances of debt issuers (14.7% of total firm-year entries) while South
Africa has the least (0.5%). On average, debt issuers make up approximately 4%
of the total observations in each country. Equity proves to be a much more
prevalent form of additional financing, however, as about 9% of the observations
have secondary offerings with the frequency of equity deals as high as 39.1% in
Australia (compared to the lowest average of 2.6% in Greece).
Next, Table 4.1B shows the median values for the financial variables and
mean values for the dummy variables during the different sub-periods. It can be
observed that accruals become more negative in most countries during the crisis
years, which might indicate an instance of conservative accounting (for instance,
goodwill impairment might have been triggered and taken by companies on the
back of worsening business developments). Sales growth, as expected, appears to
slow down during the crisis years and beyond in a vast majority of countries
(although recovery is also observed in some countries in the post-crisis period). In
terms of cash flows, the effects of the crisis on companies in the different countries
are somewhat mixed. A number of countries in fact show higher median cash flow
___________________________________________________________
38Accounting figures in the data set are in coded in local currencies, so growth rates are not
affected by exchange rate movements.
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ratios during the crisis years despite of the increasing asset base; this suggests that
the average (or median) company seems to have been able to withstand the crisis
reasonably well and that the most affected firms might have been the weaker ones.
Likewise, the proportion of firms with negative cash flows increases during the
crisis period for most countries but decreases for some others39. It is reassuring,
nevertheless, to see the mean of dNegCFO increase significantly for the countries
that are known to have been severely affected by the financial crisis (e.g, Greece,
Ireland and Spain). The deal dummies could provide insights into the fundraising
activities of the companies in the sample. The higher (lower) average values for
dEquity (dDebt) during the crisis period imply that in most countries more firms
tend to turn to the stock markets during the financial crisis and beyond for
additional funding, which is expected given the restricted access to the credit
markets. Then as the crisis eases off, the number of issuers – both debt and equity
– increases in most countries, most likely due to the low interest rates following
the quantitative easing policies enacted by central banks around the world as well
as the investors’ hunt for yields.
The financials of debt issuers and equity issuers for each country in the
sample are shown in Table 4.1C. In general, there are no clear differences in terms
of accruals. With regards to sales growth, however, it can be seen that the firms
that raise equity tend to exhibit higher increase in revenue from the previous year.
Companies in the debt-issuing subsamples have greater tangible fixed assets (as
measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets) than those
in the equity subsamples. Furthermore, equity issuers in most countries (except for
___________________________________________________________
39 The fact that there is no clear pattern here in terms of cash flow characteristics suggests
that the macro, country level factors probably have less impact on firms’ cash flows than
the individual companies’ own resilience.
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Spain, Japan and Finland) have lower median operating cash flows compared to
debt counterparts, while there are significantly more firms with negative cash
flows in the equity issuing subsamples. These observations are as expected overall
given the characteristics of the funding instruments. Indeed, equity offerings are
common means of financing for growth companies that may not have enough cash
flows to service debt or would need cash for further investments. More mature
companies with collateral value and stable cash flows would be typically utilize
more debt in their capital structure in order to lower funding costs.
Table 4.2 summarizes country level variables of the 45 nations in
the sample. As mentioned earlier, the data are sourced from La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998, 2006) and one general observation is that the rights of
shareholder and creditor rights are most favorable in common law countries
while the French civil law provides the least protection. This can be seen in
the average scores of the ‘investor rights and protection’ variables of the
different subsamples. In terms of the development of the equity and debt
markets, similar conclusions hold, i.e. the size of the capital markets
relative to GDP as well as the number of listed firms relative to population
are generally higher for common law countries. If one were to look at these
summary statistics through a different lens, it should be no coincidence that
developing countries, primarily in Asia and South America, generally score
lower developed ones on institutional and legal aspects. They also tend to
show higher GDP growth although the depth and breadth of their capital
markets are much lower than developed countries.
4.3.2Firm level regression results
The results of the Ball and Shivakumar asymmetrical timeliness model in equation
(1) are shown in Table 4.3. As previously stated, the regression is performed
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individually for each of the 45 countries in the sample using the respective firm-
year data. In general, the coefficients of the control variables turn out to be as
expected. The coefficient of ΔSALES is positive and significant in all but one
country, which is consistent with the typically positive relationship between sales
and accruals due to change in working capital. PP&E is negatively correlated with
accruals for firms in a majority of countries. This can be explained by the fact that
higher fixed assets imply higher depreciation, which would in turn decrease
accruals. The coefficients of cash flows in all countries are negative since accruals
serve to smooth the earnings by mitigating the effects of noise in operating cash
flows. The key variable of interest is dNegCFO*CFO, whose coefficient α4 in
equation (1), if positive, would imply that bad news (negative cash flows) is
recognized more timely in accruals than good news (positive cash flows). This is
the main conservatism effect, which is present and significant in most countries,
especially the more advanced economies. Conversely, a number of developing
countries show the opposite results, i.e. less conservative reporting. It should be
noted as well that the explanatory power is rather high in most models (average R-
squared of almost 30%).
Table 4.4 presents the results of the regression models according to
equation (2), where the focus is on the incremental effects that capital raisings
have on firms’ reporting behavior in the period starting two years preceding and
ending after two years following such transactions (i.e. a five-year period) 40.
Conservatism in the years leading up to equity issues would be reflected in
___________________________________________________________
40 Only the coefficients and standard errors of the variable dDeal*dNegCFO*CFO – which
represents additional conditional conservatism by companies that issue debt or equity
during a certain time window relative to those that do not – are shown. The main
conservatism effects are consistent with those reported in Table 3.
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significant and positive coefficients of dDeal*dNegCFO*CFO in columns (1) and
(2) in Table 4.4A (the same holds in Table 4.4B for debt). Likewise, if firms report
more conservatively post-deal, one would observe positive coefficients in columns
(4) and (5). Contemporaneous effects of issues on the recognition of losses in
accruals are captured in column (3).
The results in Panel A indicate conservatism in the years around equity
issues by firms in the US, Italy, Vietnam and most countries with a German legal
origin. This supports the view that timely recognition of economic losses functions
as a way for issuers to enhance earnings quality and address the demand for
conservatism by (outside) investors for improved compensation, governance
contracting and mitigation of information asymmetry between firm insiders and
outside shareholders. In a few countries (e.g. the Philippines, Egypt and Spain),
however, secondary offerings are associated with less conservative reporting albeit
the effects are rather sporadic.
In contrast to secondary offerings, debt issues appear to have insignificant
or unclear effects on conservatism for firms in the US and Italy. Less timeliness in
loss recognition in accruals around debt issues is in fact observed in countries with
German legal traditions (where sufficient data are available), as well as in
Singapore, Malaysia and Chile. The absence of significant and positive
coefficients in most countries in the sample weakens the debtholder demand
theory. A reason for this could be that the generally strong cash flows of the debt-
issuing firms reduce the probability of default and hence the importance of the
contracting benefits of conservatism. To understand the negative correlations
between conservative reporting and debt issues is, however, more difficult; one
potential explanation is that firms in these countries might want to report the best
possible profitability level in their audited financial statements in order to attract
funding from lenders and bond investors. Conversely, the results in Table 4.4
indicate increased conservatism around debt deals (especially before) in Australia
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and the UK, implying a demand for conservatism by debt providers in these two
common law countries.
Using an extensive dataset covering more than 25 years makes it possible
to perform the above regression analyses in different sub-periods. The results in
Table 4.5A show the impact of the global financial crisis on the timeliness of loss
recognition by firms in the different countries. A comparison with the aggregate
conservatism effects in Table 4.3 (the main model) reveals a number of interesting
findings. First, reporting behaviors of firms are consistent across all sub-periods in
only 26 out of the 45 countries in the sample (i.e. the coefficients carry the same
sign and either all significant or all insignificant). This means that there is
variation in the outcomes reported in Table 3. Second, although there are no main
conservatism effects in aggregate (i.e. the coefficient on the dNegCFO * CFO
variable is not significant), companies in Hong Kong, Argentina and Egypt
actually exhibit less conservatism during the financial crisis, as seen from their
significantly negative coefficients in Table 4.5A. There are also cases where the
effects in the main model disappear during the crisis period. For example, the
conservative reporting registered in Table 4.3 for Ireland, Italy and Austria is
captured in periods 2 and 4 but not in period 3, implying that firms in these three
Western European countries on average do not recognize losses more timely than
gains during the credit crunch years although they do so in the pre- and post-crisis
periods. Conversely, for Thailand and Peru, the less conservative reporting in the
main model does not show up in the crisis period. Further, for three developing
economies with a French legal origin (Brazil, Chile and the Philippines),
conservative reporting is observed only in the years preceding the crisis, while
conservatism in two Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Sweden) is in effect in
the period up to and including the crisis but disappears in the period thereafter.
Finally, the significant conservatism effect for the Netherlands in Table 4.3
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appears to be triggered by the financial crisis, as evidenced by the non-significant
coefficient in Table 4.5A in sub-period 2 and significantly positive ones in the
following sub-periods.
Tables 4.5B and 4.5C summarize the effects of fundraising activities on
how companies exercise conservatism in their financial reporting in the different
sub-periods. Increased (decreased) conservative reporting exhibited by issuers is
represented as a plus (minus) sign, with their number corresponding to the
significance level (for instance, three pluses indicate a positive correlation and
statistical significance level of 0.01 while two minuses mean that the coefficient is
negative and significant at the 0.05 level). The results in Table 4.5B show great
variation among countries. One of the countries with strong effects is the US,
where equity issuers appear to be more conservative both pre- and post-deal in the
late 80s to late 90s. Timeliness of loss recognition disappears in the 2000s prior to
the financial crisis. Pre-deal conservatism then reappears during the crisis and
remains in the period thereafter. In Italy and Vietnam, the increased conservatism
observed in Table 4.4 seems to be driven by the post-crisis period. In some other
countries, firms’ reporting behavior changes through time. For instance, equity
issuers in Mexico display more conservatism pre-crisis but less in the post-crisis
period; meanwhile in Russia less conservatism is associated with equity offerings
during the crisis but more conservative reporting is observed among companies
that raise equity in the period thereafter. While the results are varied within the
English, French and Scandinavian legal traditions, there trend is clear for the
German legal origin countries. The key observation here is that the incremental
conservatism observed in Table 4.4 is driven by positive effects during the crisis
and in the post-crisis period (with Japan exhibiting increased conservatism also in
sub-period 2).
 Compared to the results for equity-issuing firms, the relationship between
incremental conservatism and debt issues is less clear. In Australia and the UK, the
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increased conservatism shown in Table 4.4 appears to be driven by the reporting
behaviors of firms in the two countries in sub-periods 3 and 4, which supports the
debtholders’ demand view in the period in which the information asymmetry is
most acute. In France, although there is no significant relationship between debt
issues and conservatism (as reported in Table 4.4), the results in Table 4.5C
actually indicate increased conservatism by debt issuers during the crisis and
decreased conservatism post-crisis. Another observation here is that the more
(less) conservative reporting by firms in Russia (Mexico) captured in Table 4.4 is
driven by the results in the post-crisis period. Finally, in contrast to firms that raise
equity financing, debt issuers in the German origin countries (apart from China)
generally exhibit less conservatism compared to non-issuers and this result
primarily follows the reporting behavior of firms in these countries during the
recent economic downturn as well as the post-crisis period.
4.3.3Country level regression results
In the second-stage analysis, I investigate the relationship between the country
characteristics and their respective aggregate measures of conservatism. The first
set of results is reported in Table 4.6, where the dependent variable is the
coefficient α5 on the timeliness of loss recognition variable dNegCFO*CFO from
Table 3. The first observation from columns (1), (2) and (3) is that the inclusion of
the bond market development and investor right protection variables substantially
increases the explanatory power of the model. This is evident from the increase in
the R-squared statistic from 21.0% to 54.0%. The key conclusion of this table is in
column (3), which shows that conservatism is significantly lower for countries
with Scandinavian legal origin, GDP per capital growth and creditor rights. The
significantly negative coefficient on dScandinavian and insignificant coefficient
on dBritish contradict the result of Ball et al. (2008), in which Scandinavian and
English origin countries are both associated with higher level of conditional
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Table 4.6: Relation between conservatism and country-level factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES α4 α4 α4 α4 α4
dBritish -4.547 -0.748 -3.041 -2.790 -1.977
(2.831) (3.658) (3.584) (3.714) (3.702)
dFrench -3.802* -2.758 -4.359 -4.898 -4.332
(1.892) (2.379) (2.981) (2.875) (3.024)
dScandinavian -2.658 -1.847 -5.321* -7.151** -9.165**
(1.782) (3.668) (2.806) (3.027) (4.107)
GDPCapGr -1.445*** -1.308** -2.111*** -1.519** -0.549
(0.493) (0.510) (0.718) (0.723) (0.718)
MktCap_GDP 0.843 0.442 -0.939 -1.846 -1.061
(2.019) (1.800) (1.294) (1.269) (1.392)
Ln(Firms_Pop) 2.539*** 1.398 0.359 0.779 -1.159
(0.911) (1.198) (1.237) (1.271) (1.392)
Bond_GDP 7.347* 2.270 2.105 6.118**
(3.729) (3.136) (2.760) (2.924)
Creditor -1.599* -1.958** -1.941*
(0.789) (0.937) (0.940)
PriEnforce 5.449 6.792 2.040
(6.891) (5.839) (5.773)








Constant 2.331 -0.334 -27.58*** -8.960* -6.938
(3.184) (3.358) (7.200) (4.355) (5.298)
Observations 42 39 36 36 36
Adjusted R-squared 21.0% 33.8% 54.0% 49.6% 47.0%
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS regression model with robust standard errors, where the dependent variables are the
conservatism coefficients from the firm-level regressions (i.e. α4), scaled by their absolute standard
errors. Explanatory variables are country characteristics. dBritish, dFrench and dScandinavian are
indicator variables denoting whether a country has English common law, French civil law or
Scandinavian civil law legal tradition. If these dummy variables are zero, the country has a German
civil law origin. Details and sources of the other explanatory variables are provided in Table 4.2.
Figures shown are slope coefficients and within brackets are standard errors that are
heteroscedasticity-consistent.
conservatism. This could imply that the findings from that study no longer hold
when more recent data and more countries are included, although it is also worth
mentioning that the conservatism measure is different (accrual-based here
compared to the Basu model applied in Ball et al. (2008)).
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A possible explanation for the negative coefficient on Creditor is that strong
creditor rights may lessen the importance of (and therefore the demand for)
conservative reporting practice. In contrast, investor protection (based on the
assessment of risk expropriation) is positively associated with conservatism. This
suggests that asymmetrical timeliness of loss recognition is prevalent in countries
that has strong institutional framework. Substituting the risk of expropriation
(RiskExp) with the two other proxies for investor protection (RuleLaw and
Corruption), as seen in columns (4) and (5), does not change the conclusion.
Notably, the significant impact that the protection of creditor and investor rights
has on conservatism is in sharp contrast to the findings of Ball et al. (2008), where
these country factors do not appear to explain much the variation in the timeliness
of loss recognition in the different countries. To examine the relationship between
capital markets development and reporting quality, we can look at the variables
MktCap_GDP, Ln(Firms_Pop) and Bond_GDP. The fact that the first two
variables are both insignificant in columns (3), (4) and (5) means that the results
do not support the shareholder demand hypothesis. With respect to the debtholder
demand view, the size of the bond market relative to GDP is significant in only
one model (where investor protection is also considered). The evidence for the
theory that debt markets are a key determinant of conservatism is therefore rather
limited based on this analysis – again not consistent with the central result of Ball
et al. (2008).
Finally, Table 4.7 shows the results of the regression model per equation (7)
where the objective is to assess how much country-level factors could explain the
incremental conservatism effect related to a fundraising event. The dependent
variable is thus the coefficient α11 on the variable dDeal*dNegCFO*CFO, as
reported in Table 4, in each period of the five-year time window around an equity
or debt offering. Note that although only the results of the model with RiskExp are
reported, performing the same regression with the two other legal enforcement
18
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variables would yield similar conclusions (not tabulated). The main outcome of
this analysis is that, controlling for the level of market development and protection
of investor rights, countries with a German legal origin appear to show the highest
level of incremental conservatism following equity issues. This is evidenced in the
significantly positive coefficient of the intercept in column (4), compared to the
coefficients of the other legal tradition dummy variables in period t-1 and t-2 that
are negative and significant. While the effect is weaker in Scandinavian origin
countries, it may be explained by the already strong main conservatism effects of
the Scandinavian legal tradition (as previously shown in Table 4.6). After the
German origin countries, the post-deal incremental timeliness of loss recognition
due to seasoned equity offerings is observed in the data, in descending order, in
Scandinavian, English and French origin countries. Next, we look at the debt
results in columns (6) to (10). In contrast to the analysis based on the larger equity
sample set, there appears to be no clear relationship between the aggregate
incremental conservatism associated with debt deals (as reported in Table 4.4) and
the institutional factors of the countries in which the issuers are located.
4.4 Robustness checks
The Ball and Shivakumar model is used in this research because it is theoretically
sound and does not rely on share prices – which are affected by equity issues – as
a proxy for economic losses. There is another conservatism model that is
applicable for the same reason, i.e. a modified Basu (1997) model, which is based
on the prediction that negative earnings changes would have a greater tendency to
reverse than positive earnings. The rationale is similar to the accrual-based
framework. Any bad news reflected in current earnings will appear as a transitory
shock (hence will reverse), whereas the effects of positive news will be spread
over earnings in the successive periods as anticipated gains are realized. Details on
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the persistence of change in earnings conditional on earnings news can be found in
section 3.4.3in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
The outcomes of these models are presented in Appendix D (Tables IA4.1
and IA4.2). In case of conditional conservatism, negative earnings changes would
reverse more timely than positive earnings changes and the coefficient α3 in
equation 4 would be negative and significant. Table 4.8 provides evidence, based
on the alternative Basu (1977) model, for conservative reporting by companies in
the majority of the countries in the sample with Luxembourg being the only
economy with less timeliness of economic loss recognition (i.e. positive
coefficient). This finding is, however, only partly consistent with the main results
in Table 4.3, as just 14 out of 45 countries show the same reporting property by
both measures of conservatism. Notably the US is the sole English legal origin
country with consistent results, while those with German legal tradition appear to
be in much greater alignment.
 The same conclusion applies to the results of the alternative Basu models
where the deal interaction terms are included. The coefficient of interest here is α7
in equation (5), i.e. the coefficient on the variable dDeal * dNegΔIBit-1 * ΔIBit-1. In
models (1) to (5) in Table 4.9, incremental conservatism is observed in the US and
most German legal origin countries whereas the rest show no clear patterns. In
terms of the impact of debt issues on reporting behavior, the generally weak
effects of the Ball and Shivakumar models are also the case here, as shown in
models (6) to (10) in Table 4.9. The positive incremental conservatism in the UK
and Australia and negative incremental conservatism in German origin countries
are, however, no longer observed when applying the alternative Basu measure of
timeliness of loss recognition. Nevertheless, a key consideration in interpreting
these results is that the explanatory power of the alternative Basu models is
generally much weaker (R-squared statistic for most countries is below 10% in the
main models and lower yet in the models with deals) than the Ball and
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Shivakumar regressions. This strengthens the case for the latter to be used as the
primary model in this analysis.
4.5 Conclusion
I set out to address two research questions that are relevant in the fields of
accounting conservatism as well as corporate finance. The first relates to how the
debtholders’ demand and shareholders’ demand for conservative reporting differ
internationally. The second is whether variations in conservatism across the world
can be explained by institutional and market factors. In investigating into the
relative importance of the debtholders’ and equity holders’ demand, I am
motivated by the fact that these are two conflicting theories that provide a rationale
for conditional conservatism in contracting literature, both of which have found
empirical support. The debtholder demand view focuses on the role of
conservatism in enhancing debt contracting efficiency. A timely recognition of
losses benefits the lenders by triggering ex-post violations of debt covenants in a
timely manner. This allows them to more rapidly employ their decision rights,
facilitates effective monitoring and reduces deadweight agency costs. From the
perspective of shareholders, conservatism serves as a governance mechanism that
helps resolve the information asymmetry between investors and issuing firms by
reducing the ability of managers to manipulate and overstate financial
performance.
This research is carried out based on financial and deals data of companies
in 45 countries during the period 1987 – 2015. While the setup of the study is
similar to Ball et al. (2008), there are a few important differences. One is that the
measure of conservatism applied here follows the Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
accruals-based model while Ball et al. (2008) adopt the Basu (1997) model in
which economic losses are proxied by share price returns. Furthermore, the debt
and equity demand in this paper is examined at the firm level by directly observing
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the fundraising activities of the companies in the sample; the Ball et al. (2008)
study, on the other hand, measures the demand of each investor type on an
aggregate basis and refers to the size of the respective markets (i.e. debt and
equity) in each country. The other distinguishing characteristic of this paper is that
the underlying data cover a much longer timespan than Ball et al. (2008), which
provides additional insights not only in terms of the timing of conservatism
relative to deals (i.e. in the years leading up to the transaction or in the following
years) but also how debt and equity funding affects firms’ accounting choices over
time, especially around the global financing crisis when the contracting benefits
would likely be intensified. It is important to note also that the use of an extensive
dataset such as this is itself a contribution to the existing literature where the
majority of the conservatism research has been conducted based on the US data.
Insights gained from the analysis of cross-country variation in the demand for
conservatism is thus a relevant topic.
Based on the pooled regressions per country, there are indeed variations in
the reporting quality of corporates around the world. Losses are generally
recognized in accruals more timely than gains, especially in the more advanced
economies, while companies in the developing countries exhibit less conservative
reporting. When deal interaction variables are added to the base regression model,
the results provide empirical support for the shareholders’ demand view in a
number of countries – i.e. the US, Italy, Vietnam and German legal origin
countries – in which firms exercise more conservatism in their reporting behavior
in the years around equity issues. It should be mentioned as well that seasoned
equity offerings are found to be associated with less timely loss recognition in a
few countries. With respect to the correlation between conservatism and debt
deals, the absence of significant results in most countries suggests that the
debtholders’ demand for conservatism generally does not have a meaningful
impact on firms’ reporting. This could be explained by the fact that debt issuers
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generally have strong cash flows, which lower the importance of the contracting
benefits provided by conservatism. There are only two clear cases of increased
conservatism around debt financing, i.e. Australia and the UK, where
asymmetrical timeliness of loss recognition is observed mostly in the years leading
up to the issues; in German legal origin countries, Singapore, Malaysia and Chile,
debt issuers appear to recognize losses less timely than they do gains.
Interestingly, the results of this paper are in contrast to those in the Ball et al.
(2008) study, which finds that conservatism is driven by debt market demand only.
Breaking the data down by timeline into four different sub-periods
provides several additional insights not previously available in prior research.
First, companies in only 26 out of 45 countries in the sample display consistent
levels of conservatism over time, which indicate temporal effects in the data,
which are driven by the financial crisis. Firms in Hong Kong, Argentina and
Egypt, for example, report less conservatively during the 2007 – 2009 period,
while no conservatism is detected from the regressions spanning the entire
timeline. Furthermore, asymmetrical timeliness of loss recognition in Ireland, Italy
and Austria (among others) disappears during the crisis years, even though firms
in those countries do report more conservatively in the periods before and after.
Similar observations can be made in Thailand and Peru, where firms exhibit less
conservatism in the pre- and post-crisis periods, but not during the economic
downturn itself. Meanwhile, in some other nations, conservative reporting is in
effect only in certain sub-periods. The general conclusion in that the study of
firms’ reporting behaviors is certainly a dynamic field; indeed the results of this
research demonstrate that there is a great variation in conditional conservatism (or
the lack thereof) both across countries as well as through time.
The final analysis in the firm-level regressions focuses on the impact of
capital structure changes on conservatism in the different sub-periods. With
regards to the equity issues, as with the main effects, the results show different
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relationships in the different countries. American firms, for example, appear to
report losses more timely than gains in the years leading up to equity offerings
during the crisis as well as the period thereafter. This pre-deal conservatism,
however, is not captured prior to the credit crunch. One other key finding is firms
that raise equity in the German legal origin countries generally begin to apply
more conservative reporting, compared to non-issuers, after the onset of the crisis.
The relationships between equity deals and incremental conservatism are,
however, less clear in countries with the other legal traditions. Similarly, just as
there are not many significant or clear results concerning the overall association
between incremental conservatism and debt issues, so too are the temporal effects
of debt deals found to be mixed and relatively weak. In Australia and the UK,
there is some support for the debtholder demand view during the crisis as well as
the post-crisis period. The incremental conservatism caused by debt deals could
also change direction, as seen by the results in France (increased conservatism by
debt issuers during the crisis but decreased conservatism in the following years).
Finally, debt issuers in the German origin countries (apart from China) are found
to report less conservatively than non-issuers during the recent economic
downturn as well as the post-crisis period.
In the second-stage regression analysis, I utilize the weighted least square
approach to assess the extent to which the aggregate conservatism observed in
each economy can be explained by the institutional and market factors of the
various countries. The independent variables are sourced from, or based on, La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) in line with previous works that study conservatism in an
international context. The first key result here is that conditional conservatism is
significantly lower for countries with Scandinavian legal origin, GDP per capital
growth and creditor rights and higher with the level of investor protection. This
observation supports the view that strong creditor rights reduce the demand for
conservative reporting practice (i.e. substitution effect), while timeliness of loss
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recognition is common in countries that offer good protection of investor rights.
With respect to the effect of shareholders’ and debtholders’ demand on
conservatism, the regression results do not provide evidence for the former
whereas the latter is supported to a limited extent (the size of the bond market
relative to GDP is significant in only one out of three models where investor right
protection variables are included). Interestingly, the aforementioned results are not
consistent the main results of Ball et al. (2008), i.e. debt market demand drives
conditional conservatism, Scandinavian and English legal origin countries are
associated with the greater timeliness of loss recognition (relative to gains), and
the protection of creditor and investor rights does not explain much of the
variation in conservatism in the different countries.
The objective of the next and final analysis is to investigate the
relationship between incremental conservatism due to deals and the institutional
factors of the countries in which the issuers are based. The main finding there is
that German legal origin countries are associated with the highest level of
incremental conservatism following equity issues, followed by those with the
Scandinavian, English and French legal traditions. In line with the previous
analyses, no clear patterns are captured in the debt regressions.
.
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Appendix D - Additional results referred to in Chapter 4
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X ΔIB/TAt-1(lagged) # Obs
R-
squared
English legal origin countries
Australia 0.135*** -0.0832*** 0.0315 21,856 0.015
(0.0172) (0.0229) (0.0446)
United Kingdom 0.0239*** -0.0707* -0.0145 27,604 0.014
(0.00688) (0.0410) (0.0652)
Hong Kong -0.0147*** -0.000832 -0.617*** 2,355 0.093
(0.00501) (0.0472) (0.102)
India -0.0147*** -0.0528*** -0.386*** 40,396 0.049
(0.00170) (0.0158) (0.0350)
Ireland 0.0392 -0.00587 0.241* 1,239 0.047
(0.0262) (0.0629) (0.130)
Israel 0.00126 -0.269* 0.212 3,496 0.027
(0.0145) (0.157) (0.178)
Sri Lanka -0.00725 -0.166*** -0.126 1,847 0.039
(0.00817) (0.0589) (0.128)
Malaysia -0.0174*** -0.00157 -0.708*** 13,235 0.101
(0.00309) (0.0331) (0.0877)
New Zealand 0.00939 -0.0159 -0.119 1,918 0.027
(0.00825) (0.0331) (0.150)
Singapore -0.0267*** -0.0264 -0.724*** 8,428 0.110
(0.00363) (0.0312) (0.0917)
Thailand -0.0106*** -0.110** -0.397*** 6,602 0.072
(0.00312) (0.0438) (0.0785)
United States -0.00917*** -0.0398* -0.360*** 136,41 0.050
(0.00147) (0.0238) (0.0564)
South Africa -0.0141* -0.108** -0.397** 4,074 0.071
(0.00780) (0.0457) (0.158)
French legal origin countries
Argentina -0.0397*** -0.244** -0.347*** 1,021 0.153
(0.0134) (0.105) (0.129)
Belgium -0.00162 -0.0259 -0.264** 1,917 0.036
(0.00649) (0.0666) (0.116)
Brazil 0.00261 -0.165** -0.122 4,828 0.061
(0.00750) (0.0735) (0.121)
Chile -0.0126*** -0.132* -0.415*** 2,503 0.083
(0.00412) (0.0724) (0.134)
Colombia 0.00140 -0.121* -0.0642 447 0.034
(0.00545) (0.0705) (0.314)
Egypt -0.00890 -0.0347 0.0141 835 0.013
(0.00690) (0.152) (0.173)
Spain -0.0177*** -0.0815 -0.599*** 2,417 0.102
(0.00325) (0.0655) (0.152)
France -0.00307 -0.0343 -0.281*** 11,431 0.038
(0.00340) (0.0388) (0.0818)
Greece -0.0131*** -0.0149 -0.474*** 2,691 0.050
(0.00331) (0.0389) (0.120)
Indonesia -0.0196*** -0.166* -0.334 4,714 0.080
(0.00613) (0.0856) (0.218)
Italy -0.0116*** -0.0941 -0.294*** 3,923 0.041
(0.00291) (0.0672) (0.0843)
Luxembourg 0.0197* -0.212*** 0.235** 522 0.049
(0.0100) (0.0300) (0.117)









X ΔIB/TAt-1(lagged) # Obs
R-
squared
Mexico \-0.00892** -0.182** -0.230* 1,764 0.071
(0.00420) (0.0900) (0.132)
Netherlands -0.0113** -0.0214 -0.525*** 2,986 0.094
(0.00517) (0.0760) (0.140)
Peru -0.000722 -0.0388 -0.214 1,186 0.021
(0.00669) (0.0937) (0.155)
Philippines 0.0149 0.0333 -0.417*** 2,494 0.031
(0.0116) (0.0856) (0.156)
Portugal -0.0127** -0.172 -0.407*** 854 0.116
(0.00517) (0.110) (0.154)
Russia -0.00784 -0.0378 -0.300*** 2,387 0.023
(0.00666) (0.0438) (0.0935)
Turkey 0.00954 -0.0797 -0.271*** 2,855 0.061
(0.00736) (0.0823) (0.104)
Vietnam -0.0144*** 0.0374 -0.426*** 2,555 0.027
(0.00360) (0.0593) (0.145)
German legal origin countries
Austria -0.0138*** 0.0447 -0.844*** 1,461 0.152
(0.00531) (0.102) (0.148)
Switzerland -0.0113*** -0.0412 -0.460*** 3,855 0.079
(0.00388) (0.0624) (0.141)
China -0.0213*** 0.0711*** -0.811*** 33,363 0.089
(0.00192) (0.0270) (0.0570)
Germany -0.00812*** -0.0239 -0.403*** 11,999 0.061
(0.00308) (0.0418) (0.131)
Japan -0.00677*** -0.0372 -0.592*** 58,764 0.114
(0.000779) (0.0257) (0.0503)
South Korea -0.00922*** -0.165*** -0.368*** 9,614 0.101
(0.00279) (0.0360) (0.0748)
Poland -0.0187** -0.0254 -0.517*** 5,250 0.073
(0.00854) (0.0197) (0.105)
Taiwan -0.00880*** -0.00734 -0.451*** 17,345 0.045
(0.00132) (0.0356) (0.0703)
Scandinavian legal origin countries
Denmark -0.0181*** -0.181** -0.227 2,445 0.062
(0.00626) (0.0906) (0.139)
Finland 3.88e-05 -0.0327 -0.291** 2,241 0.049
(0.00540) (0.0614) (0.136)
Norway 0.00883 -0.0360 -0.153 2,983 0.023
(0.00787) (0.0439) (0.121)
Sweden 0.00994 -0.0828* 0.0219 6,980 0.011
(0.00676) (0.0432) (0.0802)
Notes: OLS regressions per country with standard errors clustered at firm and year level.
Constants and industry fixed effects are included but their coefficients are not shown. Results are
from pooled tine-series and cross-sectional regressions of variables. The dependent variable is
ΔIB, which is change in income before extraordinary items. As for the independent variables,
ΔIB/TA t-1 (lagged) is ΔIB lagged by one year and dNeg[ΔIB /TA t-1 (lagged)] is an indicator
variable for negative ΔIB/TA t-1 (lagged). All variables are deflated by beginning total assets,
except the indicator variables. All variables are deflated by beginning total assets, except the
indicator variables. Within brackets are standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent.
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Table IA4.2: Firm-level relation between conservatism and deals (alternative
measure)
Panel A: Equity results
Coeff and SE on dNeg[ΔIB/TA t-1] X ΔIB/TA t-1 X dEquity
t+2 t+1 t0 t-1 t-2
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
English legal origin countries
Australia 0.0196 -0.120* 0.0117 -0.0261 -0.184***
(0.0455) (0.0680) (0.0431) (0.0363) (0.0535)
United Kingdom 0.0706 0.105 -0.0948 -0.0745 -0.0872
(0.0848) (0.0871) (0.0635) (0.0970) (0.105)
Hong Kong -0.0841 -0.378* -0.118 0.272** 0.0791
(0.250) (0.220) (0.149) (0.116) (0.258)
India 0.0103 -0.0814 -0.0899 0.0474 0.0811
(0.135) (0.142) (0.139) (0.123) (0.0900)
Ireland -0.0858 0.00595 -0.487* -0.505 -0.949*
(0.190) (0.202) (0.280) (0.532)
Israel 0.613 -0.290 -0.648* 0.214 0.204
(0.616) (0.203) (0.381) (0.355) (0.393)
Sri Lanka -0.705 -0.119 0.869** 0.526 -0.0379
(0.564) (0.656) (0.397) (0.531) (0.367)
Malaysia 0.212 0.124 0.512*** 0.196 -0.0757
(0.192) (0.114) (0.169) (0.187) (0.194)
New Zealand 0.0435 0.602** 0.319 0.225 0.442*
(0.194) (0.148) (0.230) (0.174) (0.232)
Singapore -0.235 -0.157 -0.327 -0.259 0.0921
(0.165) (0.184) (0.241) (0.192) (0.258)
Thailand 0.0846 0.248 -0.0946 0.0470 -0.300
(0.135) (0.172) (0.141) (0.171) (0.265)
South Africa 0.665** 0.595** 0.666 0.0186 0.325
(0.332) (0.212) (0.461) (0.392) (0.306)
United States 0.203*** 0.126 0.350*** 0.429*** 0.174***
(0.0634) (0.0850) (0.0767) (0.0472) (0.0663)
French legal origin countries
Argentina -0.760** 0.176 -0.819 0.132 -0.263
(0.373) (0.281) (0.553) (0.375) (0.510)
Belgium -0.0688 0.0758 0.613 -0.407 -0.286
(0.366) (0.159) (0.403) (0.309) (0.433)
Brazil -0.153 -0.266 -0.564*** -0.476** -0.330
(0.255) (0.232) (0.201) (0.189) (0.213)
Chile -0.599** 0.303 0.0448 -0.405 0.242
(0.266) (0.261) (0.219) (0.264) (0.320)
Colombia 2.055*** 1.143** 0.675 0.270* 0.625
(0.139) (0.343) (0.438) (0.154) (0.476)
Egypt -1.855** -0.303 0.177 -0.0130 -1.232
(0.772) (0.338) (0.451) (0.608) (0.836)
Spain 0.524** -0.0337 -0.633 -0.188 -0.454*
(0.261) (0.375) (0.548) (0.501) (0.264)
France 0.250* 0.246 0.188 0.0978 -0.122
(0.150) (0.194) (0.123) (0.161) (0.192)
Greece 0.521 -0.297 0.203 1.121*** 0.471
(0.442) (0.502) (0.449) (0.321) (0.295)
Indonesia 0.234 -0.317 0.261 0.407 0.410
(0.273) (0.369) (0.221) (0.263) (0.255)
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Coeff and SE on dNeg[ΔIB/TA t-1] X ΔIB/TA t-1 X dEquity
t+2 t+1 t0 t-1 t-2
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Italy 0.227 -0.135 -0.268 0.0645 0.135
(0.159) (0.223) (0.426) (0.340) (0.184)
Luxembourg 0.336* 0.403 0.530 0.246 -1.094*
(0.194) (0.269) (0.385) (0.233) (0.596)
Mexico 0.211 -0.330* 0.114 -0.147 0.0158
(0.238) (0.173) (0.191) (0.326) (0.241)
Netherlands 0.585** 0.773 0.672* 0.202 -0.107
(0.229) (0.470) (0.384) (0.394) (0.300)
Peru 0.0689 -1.249** -0.694*** -0.470** 0.206
(0.134) (0.531) (0.210) (0.221) (0.624)
Philippines 0.717*** 0.367 -0.276 0.0972 0.198
(0.208) (0.413) (0.394) (0.281) (0.579)
Portugal 0.200 1.065** 0.869 0.953*** -0.182
(0.275) (0.340) (0.728) (0.310) (0.240)
Russia -0.287 -0.0420 -0.00144 0.0541 -0.534
(0.243) (0.237) (0.136) (0.201) (0.369)
Turkey 0.0754 0.148 -0.229 -0.0858 0.0147
(0.478) (0.163) (0.162) (0.397) (0.283)
Vietnam 0.196 0.0670 -0.0483 0.212 -0.279
(0.671) (0.332) (0.257) (0.347) (0.345)
German legal origin countries
Austria -0.318 -0.515 -0.792*** -0.674*** -0.175
(0.402) (0.346) (0.185) (0.254) (0.257)
Switzerland 0.510*** 0.208 -0.221 -0.0584 -1.268***
(0.172) (0.449) (0.262) (0.315) (0.227)
China 0.279** 0.332** 0.0373 0.355 0.393*
(0.109) (0.143) (0.189) (0.234) (0.216)
Germany -0.170 0.219 0.593*** 0.473** 0.204
(0.201) (0.244) (0.201) (0.193) (0.226)
Japan 0.126 0.142 0.000122 -0.134 0.156**
(0.0874) (0.104) (0.0874) (0.0920) (0.0641)
South Korea -0.139 0.151 -0.166 -0.0864 -0.0452
(0.149) (0.197) (0.105) (0.110) (0.123)
Poland 0.147 1.108** 0.695** 0.330 0.598***
(0.196) (0.359) (0.298) (0.216) (0.105)
Taiwan 0.164** 0.116 -0.158 -0.0155 0.277**
(0.0745) (0.130) (0.116) (0.114) (0.114)
Scandinavian legal origin countries
Denmark -0.134 0.113 -0.275 -0.0742 -0.696**
(0.339) (0.283) (0.327) (0.325) (0.294)
Finland 0.123 -0.359* 0.142 0.134 -0.309
(0.264) (0.199) (0.245) (0.215) (0.294)
Norway 0.0711 0.379 0.502*** 0.290 -0.107
(0.305) (0.261) (0.192) (0.205) (0.341)
Sweden 0.120 0.105 0.237* -0.265** -0.292
(0.140) (0.126) (0.133) (0.129) (0.204)
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Panel B: Debt results
Coeff and SE on dNeg[ΔIB/TA t-1] X ΔIB/TA t-1 X dDebt
t+2 t+1 t0 t-1 t-2
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
English legal origin countries
Australia -0.0499 1.397 -2.894*** -0.658 -0.250
(0.0671) (1.840) (0.400) (0.693) (0.443)
United Kingdom - -0.346* 0.388 -0.369 -0.833***
(0.162) (0.181) (0.412) (0.286) (0.268)
Hong Kong -0.263 -0.578 0.692*** 1.227*** 0.221
(0.608) (0.361) (0.200) (0.358) (0.323)
India -0.202 0.00287 -0.399 -0.259 0.505**
(0.171) (0.167) (0.389) (0.255) (0.233)
Ireland -0.0297 0.366 -0.367 2.256*** 0.261
(0.335) (0.249) (0.236) (0.655) (0.591)
Israel -0.914** 4.356** -0.605 1.526 -1.691***
(0.456) (0.223) (1.708) (0.991) (0.615)
Sri Lanka - - - - -
Malaysia -0.407** 0.282 -0.182 0.164 0.531***
(0.200) (0.227) (0.353) (0.241) (0.202)
New Zealand -0.112 0.00826 0.937** 0.193 0.658
(0.310) (0.411) (0.433) (0.367) (0.432)
Singapore -0.214 0.275 0.336 0.595*** -0.652**
(0.177) (0.360) (0.291) (0.231) (0.255)
Thailand 0.473 0.550** 0.543** -0.0819 -0.0773
(0.346) (0.214) (0.212) (0.327) (0.222)
South Africa -0.0878 -0.190* 0.219 0.211** -0.0692
(0.110) (0.110) (0.150) (0.0942) (0.123)
United States 1.070 0.123 -0.559 0.465 1.155***
(0.657) (0.152) (0.666) (0.971) (0.181)
French legal origin countries
Argentina -0.0877 -0.264 0.185 -0.0945 -1.238**
(0.244) (0.376) (0.398) (0.370) (0.520)
Belgium - - -0.390** 0.180 -0.00149
(0.318) (0.227) (0.181) (0.674) (0.465)
Brazil -0.341 -0.208 -0.497*** -0.183 -0.161
(0.237) (0.211) (0.155) (0.286) (0.175)
Chile -0.496 -0.151 0.0980 0.326 -0.852*
(0.555) (0.272) (0.528) (0.217) (0.438)
Colombia -1.139* 0.0276 0.322 -0.524 0.0997
(0.657) (0.488) (0.568) (0.437) (1.169)
Egypt - - - - -
Spain - -0.542 -1.083*** -0.175 -0.780*
(0.394) (0.374) (0.211) (0.323) (0.461)
France -0.00998 -0.426 -0.00127 -0.367*** -0.348
(0.271) (0.370) (0.150) (0.133) (0.303)
Greece - 506.4** -1.361 2.816** -3.659***
(0.160) (17.97) (1.223) (1.099) (0.714)
Indonesia 0.332 - 0.116 0.722*** 0.831*
(0.377) (0.204) (0.349) (0.221) (0.433)
Italy 0.0562 -0.356 0.0408 0.935*** 0.0649
(0.265) (0.262) (0.154) (0.267) (0.322)
Luxembourg - -0.242 -0.242 -1.232** -0.410
(0.212) (0.783) (0.558) (0.610) (0.460)
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Coeff and SE on dNeg[ΔIB/TA t-1] X ΔIB/TA t-1 X dDebt
t+2 t+1 t0 t-1 t-2
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mexico 0.210 -0.177 0.108 -0.161 0.0436
(0.210) (0.200) (0.239) (0.306) (0.280)
Netherlands 0.141 1.799 0.991** 0.826*** 0.333
(0.390) (1.362) (0.461) (0.187) (0.779)
Peru -0.153** - -0.910*** -0.275** 0.865**
(0.0628) (0.555) (0.254) (0.114) (0.404)
Philippines 0.218 0.237 0.442* 0.442 1.265***
(0.165) (0.434) (0.263) (0.301) (0.380)
Portugal -0.544** 0.909** 2.984 -0.266 0.857*
(0.261) (0.284) (2.161) (0.434) (0.437)
Russia -0.0360 0.110 -0.472* -0.194 -0.480
(0.460) (0.293) (0.282) (0.160) (0.467)
Turkey -1.180** 0.383 -4.212* -0.671 -0.445
(0.525) (1.494) (2.352) (1.442) (0.905)
Vietnam - - - 1.291*** -
(0.267)
German legal origin countries
Austria -0.342* 0.0817 0.0346 0.533 -0.730**
(0.190) (0.279) (0.246) (0.602) (0.363)
Switzerland -0.339 0.728** -1.476*** -0.0278 -0.0789
(0.380) (0.228) (0.423) (0.261) (0.270)
China 0.00129 0.595** 0.562*** 0.184 -0.146
(0.114) (0.0689) (0.180) (0.166) (0.352)
Germany -0.0341 -0.901** 0.160 -0.363 0.0277
(0.0636) (0.427) (0.166) (0.221) (0.248)
Japan -0.0146 -0.00912 0.0520 0.120 -0.0877
(0.0901) (0.123) (0.114) (0.0847) (0.107)
South Korea - - -0.217* -0.325** -0.491**
(0.133) (0.154) (0.119) (0.156) (0.212)
Poland 2.570** - 1.177*** 0.813*** -
(1.117) (0.411) (0.105) (0.232)
Taiwan 0.300 0.129 0.450 0.652** 0.105
(0.290) (0.268) (0.387) (0.308) (0.192)
Scandinavian legal origin countries
Denmark -0.155 -0.0786 -0.107 0.669 0.919***
(0.486) (0.587) (0.761) (0.662) (0.259)
Finland -0.629 0.199 -0.0200 0.247* 0.150
(0.451) (0.393) (0.256) (0.128) (0.251)
Norway - -0.0847 -0.932 -1.332** 0.384
(0.426) (0.163) (1.812) (0.621) (0.544)
Sweden -1.015** -0.674 0.133 -0.404 -0.154
(0.405) (0.519) (0.280) (0.387) (0.514)
Notes: OLS regressions per country with standard errors clustered at firm and year level. Constants
and industry fixed effects are included but their coefficients are not shown. Results are from pooled
tine-series and cross-sectional regressions of variables. The dependent variable is ΔIB, which is
change in income before extraordinary items. As for the independent variables, ΔIB/TA t-1 (lagged)
is ΔIB lagged by one year, dNeg[ΔIB /TA t-1 (lagged)] is an indicator variable for negative ΔIB/TA
t-1 (lagged), and dEquity (dDebt) is an indicator variable for an equity (debt) issue during the fiscal
year. All variables are deflated by beginning total assets, except the indicator variables. All
variables are deflated by beginning total assets, except the indicator variables. Within brackets are






This chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the empirical analyses in the
fields of finance and accounting included in this dissertation. The first study
analyzes the link between the use of private leverage in concentrated ownership
structures and corporate policy, specifically dividend payouts. The focus of the
next two chapters is shifted to the relationship between accounting and corporate
finance. In Chapter 3, we examine the demand for accounting conservatism as
well as the impact of capital structure decisions on firms’ reporting behavior in the
United States. The study in the final chapter remains on the topic of conservative
accounting but has a broader international scope.
Chapter 2 looks into dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance
blockholdings and investigates its relationship with dividend policy. Using panel
data from France where pyramidal ownership structures are prevalent, we find that
companies exposed to blockholder leverage increase their dividends in the years
following the global financial crisis in 2008/2009. Meanwhile, in the pre-crisis
period, we do not observe any significant difference in payout policy between
firms with leveraged blockowners and others. The reluctance of block-owned
companies to cut dividends even (or especially) when earnings are hit by a
negative shock is driven by dominant owners’ need for cash dividends to meet




private leverage of dominant shareholders on corporate decisions and introduces
blockholder leverage as a potentially important determinant of payout policy in
times of financial distress.
Chapter 3 examines the relative importance of debtholders’ and
shareholders’ demand for conservative accounting by investigating the influence
of capital structure decisions on firms’ accounting choices. We use the accruals-
based measure of conditional conservatism and employ large financial and deals
datasets for US firms covering the period 1988 to 2013. Our results provide further
support for the shareholders’ demand for conservative accounting, as firms that
raise equity are found to exhibit increasing conservatism in the period preceding
the deals. Interestingly, in contrast to earlier findings, we do not find evidence for
the debtholders’ demand for conservatism. Looking further into deal types, we
observe that the greater timeliness of loss recognition is driven by the demand of
shareholders in the public markets. We conclude that conservative accounting
serves as a signal of reliability to equity investors in order to receive more
favorable deal terms in the period leading up to a fundraising event and that
managers time their earnings behavior in the years leading up to an issue.
The final chapter extends the study of accounting conservatism to a global
setting. For this cross-country analysis, I create an extensive dataset consisting of
more than half a million firm-year observations in 45 countries over the period
1987 to 2015 – which in itself a contribution to the existing literature where the
majority of the conservatism research has been US-centric. Applying the Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) accruals-based conservatism model, I find variations in the
reporting quality of corporates around the world with one general conclusion being
that conservative accounting is generally more prevalent in advanced economies
than in developing countries. When fundraising activities are considered, the
results provide empirical support for the shareholders’ demand view in a number




sample also is also found to change over time, especially around the financial
crisis. The second part of Chapter 4 then proceeds to assess the extent to which the
aggregate conservatism observed in each economy can be explained by the
institutional and market factors of the various countries. I utilize the weighted least
square method and find that conservatism is associated not only with the legal
origin of the counties but also their institutional factors (in terms of protection of
creditor rights as well as investor rights). Furthermore, the country-level analysis
shows only limited support for the debt market demand for conservatism, which
contradicts the main results of Ball et al. (2008).
Taken together, the empirical findings in the preceding chapters
demonstrate not only certain ways in which corporate finance, corporate
governance and accounting are connected, but also the relevance of their
relationships to the business world. Indeed, a key message from Chapter 2 is that,
when assessing a prospective investment in a public company, investors should
pay attention to the ownership structure and the holding’s leverage in addition to
the information of the listed entity. Insights from chapter 3 and 4 enhance the
understanding of firms’ reporting behavior around critical corporate finance
decisions and should therefore be of interest to users of financial statements. The
relationships between these three fields are also dynamic, as seen from the fact
that firms, managers and blockholders respond differently to the financial crisis
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Dit hoofdstuk is een samenvatting van de belangrijkste conclusies van de
empirische analyses in het domein van financiën en boekhouding die in dit
proefschrift zijn opgenomen. In de eerste studie wordt het verband tussen het
gebruik van private hefboomwerking in geconcentreerde eigendomsstructuren en
het bedrijfsbeleid geanalyseerd, in het bijzonder dividenduitkeringen. In de
volgende twee hoofdstukken wordt de aandacht verlegd naar de relatie tussen
boekhouding en bedrijfsfinanciering. In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken we de vraag
naar boekhoudkundig conservatisme en de impact van
kapitaalstructuurbeslissingen op het rapporteringsgedrag van bedrijven in de
Verenigde Staten. De studie in het laatste hoofdstuk gaat eveneens over het
onderwerp van conservatieve boekhouding, maar heeft een bredere internationale
reikwijdte.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat dieper in op het gebruik van hefboomwerking door
dominante eigenaren om groepsaandeelhouderschappen te financieren en
onderzoekt hoe dit in verbinding staat met het dividendbeleid. Aan de hand van
paneldata uit Frankrijk, waar piramidale eigendomsstructuren veel voorkomen,
zien we dat de dividenden van bedrijven die te maken hebben met
hefboomwerking van groepsaandeelhouders toenemen in de jaren na de
wereldwijde financiële crisis in 2008/2009. Terwijl we in de periode voorafgaand
aan de crisis geen merkbaar verschil zien in het uitkeringsbeleid tussen bedrijven
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met als hefboom werkende groepsaandeelhouders en anderen. De
terughoudendheid van bedrijven in groepsbezit om zelfs (of vooral) dividenden te
beperken wanneer de winst door een negatieve schok wordt getroffen, wordt
gedreven door de behoefte van dominante eigenaars aan contante dividenden om
aan schuldverplichtingen in het aandeelhouderschap te voldoen. Onze studie geeft
inzicht in de impact van private hefboomwerking van dominante aandeelhouders
op bedrijfsbeslissingen en introduceert de hefboomwerking van
groepsaandeelhouders als een potentieel belangrijke bepalende factor voor het
uitkeringsbeleid in tijden van financiële onrust.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt het relatieve belang van de vraag van debiteuren en
aandeelhouders naar een conservatieve boekhouding onderzocht door de invloed
van kapitaalstructuurbeslissingen op de boekhoudkundige keuzes van bedrijven te
onderzoeken. We gebruiken de maatstaf van voorwaardelijk conservatisme op
transactiebasis en maken gebruik van grote financiële en transactiedatasets voor
Amerikaanse bedrijven voor de periode 1988 tot 2013. Onze resultaten bieden
verdere ondersteuning voor de vraag van de aandeelhouders naar een
conservatieve boekhouding, aangezien bedrijven die het eigen vermogen verhogen
steeds conservatiever blijken te zijn in de periode voorafgaand aan de transacties.
Verrassend genoeg hebben we geen bewijs gevonden voor de vraag naar
conservatisme door debiteuren, in tegenstelling tot eerdere bevindingen. Als we
verder kijken naar de soorten transacties, zien we dat een snellere herkenning van
verliezen wordt gedreven door de vraag van aandeelhouders op de publieke
markten. We concluderen dat een conservatieve boekhouding dient als een signaal
van betrouwbaarheid aan aandelenbeleggers om gunstigere transactievoorwaarden
te ontvangen in de periode voorafgaand aan een fondsenwervingsevenement en dat
managers hun winstgedrag timen in de jaren die voorafgaan aan een
problematische situatie.
Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
____________________________________________________________
207
Het laatste hoofdstuk vormt een uitbreiding van de studie van
boekhoudkundig conservatisme naar een globale omgeving. Voor deze analyse
van verschillende landen stel ik een uitgebreide dataset samen die bestaat uit meer
dan een half miljoen observaties van een bedrijfsjaar in 45 landen in de periode
1987 tot 2015 – wat op zich al een bijdrage vormt aan de bestaande literatuur,
waarin het merendeel van het onderzoek naar conservatisme is gericht op de VS.
Bij toepassing van het Ball en Shivakumar-model (2005) voor conservatisme op
transactiebasis, tref ik variaties aan in de rapportagekwaliteit van bedrijven over de
hele wereld, met als algemene conclusie dat conservatieve boekhouding over het
algemeen vaker voorkomt in geavanceerde economieën dan in
ontwikkelingslanden. Als we kijken naar fondsenwervingsactiviteiten, bieden de
resultaten in een aantal landen empirische ondersteuning voor de vraag van de
aandeelhouders. Bovendien blijkt ook het conservatisme van de bedrijven in de
steekproef te veranderen in de loop van de tijd, met name rond de financiële crisis.
In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 4 wordt vervolgens nagegaan in hoeverre het
geaggregeerde conservatisme dat in elke economie wordt waargenomen, kan
worden verklaard door de institutionele en marktfactoren van de verschillende
landen. Ik gebruik de gewogen kleinste-kwadratenmethode en stel vast dat
conservatisme niet alleen verband houdt met de juridische oorsprong van de
landen, maar ook met hun institutionele factoren (op het gebied van bescherming
van de rechten van de schuldeisers, maar ook de rechten van de investeerders).
Bovendien blijkt uit de analyse op landelijk niveau dat de vraag naar
conservatisme op de schuldmarkt slechts beperkt wordt ondersteund, wat indruist
tegen de belangrijkste resultaten van Ball et al. (2008).
De empirische bevindingen in de voorgaande hoofdstukken laten niet
alleen zien hoe bedrijfsfinanciering, bedrijfsbestuur en boekhouding met elkaar
verbonden zijn, maar ook hoe relevant hun onderlinge relaties zijn voor het
bedrijfsleven. Een belangrijke boodschap uit hoofdstuk 2 is dat beleggers bij de
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beoordeling van een toekomstige investering in een beursgenoteerd bedrijf niet
alleen moeten letten op de informatie van de beursgenoteerde entiteit, maar ook op
de eigendomsstructuur en het hefboomeffect van het bedrijf. De bevindingen uit
hoofdstuk 3 en 4 vergroten het inzicht in het rapporteringsgedrag van bedrijven
omtrent kritische bedrijfsfinancieringsbeslissingen en zouden daarom van belang
moeten zijn voor gebruikers van jaarrekeningen. De relaties tussen deze drie
gebieden zijn daarnaast ook dynamisch, zoals blijkt uit het feit dat bedrijven,
managers en groepsaandeelhouders verschillend reageren op de financiële crisis,
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structure decisions on firm reporting behaviors. In Chapter 3, we investigate US firms that attracted new 
funds from capital markets and find support for the demand for conservative reporting by shareholders 
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therefore reducing the importance of the role of financial reports in debt contracting or as a governance 
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The final chapter focuses on the international aspect of accounting conservatism. Using an extensive 
dataset, I find variations in the reporting quality of corporates around the world. Additionally, the results 
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institutional factors.
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